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I. INTRODUCTION
Today may be the most uncertain time we have ever experienced in school
desegregation. The Court's past decisions have always provided a basis to
predict the future with some reasonable certainty because desegregation was
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Catholic University Law Review
largely in the hands of the federal courts and government. Some decisions
expanded desegregation, most contracted it, but we always knew that courts
would deal with school districts in one of two ways. They would either force a
district to continue desegregating within the Court's most recent parameters or
they would relieve a district of its obligation because the district's
circumstances no longer fell within the Court's parameters. Moreover, we
could generally predict the type of districts that would fall on either side of
these parameters.
Today all certainty as to desegregation is gone. Only half of the school
districts that were under direct court order in the mid 1980s are still under
court order,1 and courts are placing only minimal requirements on those that
2remain under court orders. The days of court supervision are numbered. The
relative inactivity and passivity of these cases are probably best illustrated by
the fact that the Court's last school desegregation case was more than a decade
ago.3 Before this, the Court's docket swelled with desegregation cases.4 Now,
after a decade of inactivity, the Court decided Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,5 but for the first time failed to provide
a clear path forward for desegregation.
In some respects, the future is beyond the Court's control because the case
involved voluntary rather than mandatory desegregation. 6 Parents Involved
highlights a reversal of fortune, where desegregation rests largely on the
goodwill of school districts. With the increasingly dwindling number of
mandatory desegregation cases, future desegregative efforts are becoming a
matter of discretion for the vast majority of districts. Whether school districts
will summon the leadership necessary to continue the pursuit of Brown v.
Board of Education's7 promise is unknown.
Prior to the decision in Parents Involved, however, many thought a decision
striking down the voluntary efforts of Seattle and Louisville would likely
1. Department of Justice data shows that the United States was a party to roughly half as
many desegregation lawsuits in 2007 as in 1984. U.S. COMM. ON Civ. RTS., BECOMING LESS
SEPARATE? SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ENFORCEMENT, AND THE PURSUIT
OF UNITARY STATUS, at 22-23 (2007), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/092707_Becoming
LessSeparateReport.pdf [hereinafter BECOMING LESS SEPARATE].
2. Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1157, 1160
(2000) [hereinafter Wendy Parker, School Desegregation] (arguing that although desegregation
litigation was not dead in 2000, most surviving cases suffered from severe neglect).
3. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
4. For instance, in 1991 and 1992, the Court decided Board of Education of Oklahoma City
Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) and Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) in
successive years. The 1960s and 70s represented the height of desegregation litigation. See Mark
Chadsey, Federal Courts and School Desegregation, 27 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 149, 158 (2002).
5. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
6. See id at 2746.
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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portend the end of desegregation. 8  Thus, the stakes could not have been
higher. In fact, although I did not believe desegregation would necessarily
end, I believed that voluntary desegregation efforts were essentially the only
viable signs that equitable and desegregated schools could be achieved.9
In retrospect, the cases may have been given too much credit. Civil rights
advocates, including myself, are so deeply committed to the promise of Brown
that admitting that it is now beyond our grasp is unnatural. Some of us may
have been victims of our own persevering hope, believing that, if the Court
would merely affirm these laudable school districts, they would be the
exemplary foundation to reverse the trend of resegregation. I am disheartened
to admit now that desegregation was effectively dying prior to the decision in
Parents Involved.'0  No decision would have singlehandedly resurrected
desegregation. This is not to say that desegregation need remain on its current
course. In fact, schools, states, and courts still have the power to integrate and
equalize schools.'' What they too often lack is the will. Half-hearted efforts,
although symbolic, are equivalent to doing nothing at all. Thus, the future of
desegregation is uncertain today. Will the nation turn its back on
desegregation or pursue it anew? This time we do not know because the power
rests in the hands of fifty states and more than ten-thousand school districts
rather than the the Supreme Court, which has long since refused to mandate
effective desegregation.
12
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Parents Involved only bears
significance on this matter in two respects. First, his opinion sends a message
to school districts about the wisdom of pursuing desegregation. On this point,
his opinion is both encouraging and discouraging. It praises the educational
interest schools have in desegregation,' 3 but it also suggests schools will have a
8. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 277 (2007)
(positing that the Court may "write ... the final chapter of the constitutional and cultural legacy
of Brown in public education" when it decides Parents Involved).
9. Brief of the Civil Rights Clinic at Howard University School of Law as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 20-21, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908 & 05-915), 2006 WL 2927072.
10. Reflecting on his experiences with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Dennis Parker
remarks that the end of desegregation has been declared numerous times, only to persevere on.
Dennis D. Parker, Are Reports of Brown's Demise Exaggerated? Perspectives of a School
Desegregation Litigator, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2005). Parents Involved, however,
involved a fundamentally different question than all previous cases because the Court has grown
so conservative that the issue is no longer whether desegregation can be compelled but whether
voluntary desegregation can be prohibited.
11. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Courts'Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1599-1602 (2003) (discussing the failures of
desegregation, but arguing that the federal government, states, and courts have the power to
desegregate schools).
12. See id. at 1600-01 (asserting that "[t]he resegregation of schools is largely a result of the
[Supreme] Court's decisions").
13. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788.
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heavy burden to carry in devising a plan that he would deem appropriately
tailored to that interest. 14  Second, Justice Kennedy's opinion will become
relevant if and when school districts summon the will to aggressively
desegregate. At that point, his opinion will unfortunately constrain rather than
embolden them.
The remainder of this Article primarily addresses the rationale, constraints,
and effect of Justice Kennedy's opinion. This Article is divided into three
parts: where we were, where we are, and where we are going. The first part
explores the legal history of desegregation, the extent to which desegregation
has occurred, the problems that currently beleaguer predominantly minority
schools, and the precedential value of Grutter v. Bollinger15 in addressing these
problems. The second part describes and analyzes Justice Kennedy's opinion
in Parents Involved, pointing out how it diverges from Grutter and confuses
desegregation with diversity. This Article, however, also acknowledges that a
more forgiving reading of Kennedy's opinion is plausible. Part three assesses
the constraints his opinion would place on districts that choose to desegregate
and the options that may be available to them.
II. THE HOPES AND HISTORY OF DESEGREGATION: THE ROAD TO SEATTLE
AND LOUISVILLE
A. At the End of a Long, Slow Torturing of Brown
Since the mid- and late-1970s, the Supreme Court has consistently
undermined aggressive and effective desegregation. The Court's most forceful
precedents in favor of school desegregation came in 1968 and 1971 in Green v.
County School Board 6 and Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of
Education.17 But just two years after Swann the Court began to limit school
desegregation. In Keyes v. School District No. 1,18 the Court distinguished de
facto from de jure segregation, holding that de facto segregation was of no
constitutional concern and courts had no power to remedy it.'9 This holding
forced victims of segregation to prove that segregation was the result of the
school system's intentionally discriminatory acts.20  Proving intentional
14. Id. at 2789-91.
15. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
16. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
17. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
18. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
19. Id. at 208 (emphasizing that de jure segregation required a "purpose or intent to
segregate"). The Court held that without the requisite intent there was no constitutional violation,
and thus "'no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis."' Id. at 212
(quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 28).
20. Id. at 208 ("[W]e hold that a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions
... creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It
establishes, in other words, a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of
school authorities .... ").
[Vol. 57:947
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discrimination or de jure segregation, however, can be difficult, particularly in
northern school districts that never passed laws explicitly mandating
segregation. Although common sense dictates that almost all school
22segregation was generally a product of state action and at least four members
of the Supreme Court would agree, 23 plaintiffs who fail to demonstrate state
action have no recourse for segregated and unequal schools.
One year after Keyes, the Court placed further limits on desegregation in
Milliken v. Bradley, holding that even when a plaintiff demonstrates intentional
school segregation, the remedy cannot reach beyond the school district
boundaries unless the plaintiff also demonstrates that schools outside those
boundaries collaborated in segregation. 24  Such evidence, however, is often
scarce. Thus, in school districts such as Detroit, where the school district was
nearly all black and most whites had moved to the suburbs, taking their tax
dollars with them, 25 courts are powerless to provide an integrative remedy. In
addition, Milliken signaled to whites that they could avoid desegregation and
21. See Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 712 (2d Cir.
1979) (reversing a desegregation order for the achievement of racial balance in suburban New
York and stating, "our authority to order remedial action depends upon a determination that the
state, by law (de jure), has discriminated on the basis of race or color in violation of federal law");
Pride v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, 482 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir. 1973) (denying injunctive relief
for the parents of black and non-white students residing in public housing in a New York school
district and stating that the "plaintiffs had failed to adduce evidence to support... either intent to
discriminate or a de facto discriminatory effect"); Brody-Jones v. Macchiarola, 503 F. Supp.
1185, 1243 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that segregation at the middle-level of a Queens, New
York, school district was the result of school assignment-based housing patterns and not
actionable de facto segregation); Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (D.N.J. 1971)
(granting a New Jersey school district's motion to dismiss, stating "that a federal court is
precluded, by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and also by the unanimous opinion of the
Supreme Court, from imposing upon school authorities the affirmative duty to cure racial
imbalance in the situation of 'de facto' segregation described herein" (citation omitted)) af'd,
404 U.S. 1027 (1972); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 1610 (discussing the difficulty of
proving intent in northern school districts and noting that "requiring proof of a discriminatory
purpose created a substantial obstacle to desegregation").
22. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 227-28 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation was meaningless because
all schools are creatures of the state and have the power to control and maintain the segregation
that exists in schools).
23. Although the dissenters in Parents Involved do not argue that the schools must remedy
de facto segregation, they find little meaning in the distinction in so far as the issue is whether the
schools can remedy it. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding
"de facto segregation . . . meaningless in the present context," with Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
24. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974).
25. See Mark C. Rahdert, Obstacles and Wrong Turns on the Road From Brown: Milliken
v. Bradley and the Quest for Racial Diversity in Education, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv.
785, 800-01 (2004).
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build exclusive enclaves by simply moving across the school district line.26 In
that respect, Milliken likely exacerbated segregation.
27
In more recent cases, rather than simply limiting the effect of desegregation,
the Court has established principles by which to bring it to an end.2' For
instance, the Court held in Freeman v. Pitts that school districts, in most
instances, will be relieved of their desegregative responsibility if they can
establish that demographic changes occurred within their district during
desegregation.29 Relying on these holdings, lower courts increasingly granted
school districts "unitary status" and lifted court orders mandating
desegregation. 30  Those courts that have retained supervision over schools
generally make minimal demands, if any at all, for desegregation. 31  The
practical effect of the Court's jurisprudence is bome out by the Department of
Justice's declining involvement in school desegregation. Since the 1960s, the
Department of Justice has been a leading force in desegregating schools. By
1984, it had a total of 525 active school desegregation cases. 33 By May 2007,
however, that number had fallen to 266.34
26. See id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 1608.
27. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 1607-09 ("[I]n many areas the Milliken holding makes
desegregation impossible.").
28. For a brief discussion of cases beyond Freeman v. Pitts, see Chemerinsky, supra note
11, at 1615-19.
29. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495-96 (1992).
30. See, e.g., NAACP v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 971 (11 th Cir. 2001) (affirming
unitary status and agreeing with the district court's finding that "the NAACP was unable to
demonstrate that the continued existence of identifiably black schools ... is a vestige of dejure
segregation"); Manning ex rel. Manning v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough County, 244 F.3d 927, 929
(11 th Cir. 2001) (reversing the district court and finding unitary status); Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d
453, 465 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he district court . . . ordered that Defendants are entitled to a
declaration of unitary status . . . . We are satisfied that the district court did not err .... ");
Lockett v. Bd. of Educ. of Muscogee County Sch. Dist., Il1 F.3d 839, 844 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (affirming the district court's declaration of unitary status); Hampton v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (declaring unitary status in areas found
segregated in 1970-74); Davis v. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac, 95 F. Supp. 2d 688, 697 & n.12 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (granting private party's motion to dissolve twenty-five year old desegregation
decree).
31. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., No. 3:70cv845-MHT, 2006 WL 1041994, at
*5 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 20, 2006) (articulating the terms of a consent decree by which the school
district is required to comply with monitoring of its programs and activities in furtherance of
desegregation); BECOMING LESS SEPARATE, supra note 1, at 12 (indicating that some schools do
not even know the extent to which they are still bound by old desegregation orders); Wendy
Parker, School Desegregation, supra note 2, at 1160 ("[M]ost cases suffer from extreme
neglect-little activity will occur for years, if not decades, but the court-ordered remedies remain
in place. The clear majority of school districts appear content with their outstanding court
orders.").
32. See BECOMING LESS SEPARATE, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that in the early 1970s the
Department of Justice "reported that it was supervising 235 education cases").
33. Id.
34. Id. at 23.
[Vol. 57:947
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Court-ordered desegregation cannot operate in perpetuity. At some point,
courts must return autonomy to local authorities. This return, however, is
predicated on the elimination of racialized and unequal schools.
Unfortunately, many districts have never fully accomplished this task.35  In
fact, the gains that were made during the first decades of desegregation have
all but evaporated. Over the past decade and a half, schools across the nation
have rapidly resegregated. 36 Many public schools are as segregated today as
they were in the early 1970s, when serious desegregation began.
3
For instance, when the Supreme Court authorized the lower courts to grant
Oklahoma City unitary status in 1991, the average black student attended a
school that was 68% minority. 38 By 2001, that number increased to 79%.39 If
ending court supervision was appropriate at the time of decision, courts cannot
be blamed for resegregation that occurs after the fact. Many school districts,
however, were experiencing and maintaining significant school segregation at
the time the courts withdrew their supervision. For instance, in Duval County,
Florida, the percentage of schools that were racially identifiable (exceeding a
75% African American student population) had ranged from 18 to 21% during
the final years of court-mandated desegregation. In 2001, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dissolution of the desegregation decree
even though twenty-six schools in the county remained racially identifiable. a
More simply, thirty years of court-ordered desegregation only reduced the
42number of racially identifiable schools in the county by three. Unfortunately,
these school districts are but examples of a pattern rather than exceptions.43
B. In the Midst of Meek Desegregation Plans
Many school districts learned the lesson of Brown even if they did not
achieve its full promise. 4 In addition to Louisville and Seattle, several school
districts have recognized the role of integrated schools in delivering equitable
35. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S
NIGHTMARE? 38 tbl.20 (Civ. Rts. Proj. 2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.
ucla.edu/research/reseg04/brown50.pdf (showing that in all but five cases where the court
declared a district unitary between 1990 and 2002, black-white exposure has fallen in the school
district).
36. See id. at 4.
37. Id at 18-20 & tbls. 7 & 8.
38. Id. at 37.
39. Id.
40. NAACP v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 969 (11 th Cir. 2001).
41. Id. at 962, 969.
42. Id. at 969.
43. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 35, at 35-39.
44. See Derek W. Black, Beyond Brown: Its Impact Upon American Education and Culture,
NAT'L BAR ASS'N MAO., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 14, 15 ("Despite setbacks, disappointments and the
continued existence and prevalence of racial oppression, Brown has succeeded in changing our
nation's basic understanding of racial injustice.").
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educational opportunities, and some have voluntarily implemented student
assignment plans aimed at reducing segregation.45  Predicting that a court
would dissolve their desegregation decree were it to revisit the issue, other
school districts have attempted to remain quietly beneath the attention of
district courts and adverse parents. Unfortunately, too few schools have a
serious and continuing commitment to desegregation. The trend of
resegregation is too widespread to be counterbalanced by the efforts of the few.
Even among most of the willing, the effort to desegregate is too meek. With
the exception of school districts such as Louisville, Seattle, and Lynn,
Massachusetts, 47 which have explicitly used race to ensure significant levels of
48stabilized desegregation, most voluntarily desegregating school districts
announce a commitment to desegregation, but fail to implement the aggressive
practical measures necessary to achieve desegregation.49 In fact, of those
voluntarily desegregating districts with the most publicized plans, most do not
even use race as a factor in student assignments, and the others use it only
45. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 7 (lst Cir. 2005) (adjudicating one
public school district's voluntary desegregation program); Brief of the Council of the Great City
Schools as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908 & 05-915); see also NAACP
LEGAL DEF. EDUC. FUND, INC., LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: VOLUNTARY K-12 SCHOOL
INTEGRATION; A MANUAL FOR PARENTS, EDUCATORS, AND ADVOCATES 20-25
(2005), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/manual/desegmamanu.php
[hereinafter LOOKING TO THE FUTURE] (discussing various voluntary desegregation strategies).
46. See BECOMING LESS SEPARATE, supra note 1, at 12; see also Assessing the Impact of
Judicial Taxation on Local Communities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight
and the Courts of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 24 (1996) (statement of Alfred
A. Lindseth, outside counsel for the State of Missouri) (suggesting that some schools wish to stay
under court order so that they can continue to receive supplemental funding for desegregation).
47. For a description of Lynn's plan, see Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm.,
283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 347-50 (D. Mass. 2003), affd, 418 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
48. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746-47 (discussing Seattle School District No. I's
policy of using race as an alternative .'tiebreaker' to determine who will fill the open slots at the
oversubscribed school"); id. at 2749 (discussing the Louisville school board's assignment plan
"requir[ing] all nonmagnet schools to maintain a minimum black enrollment of 15 percent, and a
maximum black enrollment of 50 percent"); Comfort, 418 F.3d at 6 ("Students who do not wish
to attend their neighborhood school may apply to transfer to another school. Approval of a
transfer depends, in large part, on the requesting student's race and the racial makeup of the
transferor and transferee schools.").
49. Of the case studies presented in a recent Civil Rights Project report, only two of the
seven voluntarily desegregating schools were maintaining significant levels of integration.
NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: VOLUNTARY K-12
SCHOOL INTEGRATION; A MANUAL FOR PARENTS, EDUCATORS & ADVOCATES, 46-58 (2008)
[hereinafter STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE]. However, those two districts, Wake County,
North Carolina, and Berkeley, California, have unique demographic factors that are contributing
to their effectiveness. Berkeley, for instance, is a relatively small school district of less than
10,000 students and has a multiracial population with no predominant ethnicity. Id. at 46.
[Vol. 57:947
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minimally. 50 Although these approaches may stave off litigation, they can also
stave off desegregation. Without race, schools lack any measure to ensure
desegregation. Race-neutral plans theoretically could produce integrated
schools, but by leaving so much to chance and parental prerogative, most
produce very few, if any, integrated schools in practice.
51
For instance, the San Francisco Unified School District relies on parental
choice, geographic proximity, extreme poverty, socioeconomic status,
academic achievement, and home language to assign students, but it does not
52consider race. Moreover, it continues to exclude race as a factor even though
segregation is otherwise out of its control.53 As the United States District
Court for the Northem District of Califomia flatly put it, "the district has
become increasingly resegregated" since initiating this plan. 54 The same can
be said of Charlotte-Mecklenburg, which relies on various factors other than
race, 55 while watching its schools drastically resegregate and academic
50. See id. at 43-61 (revealing that only three out of seven of the voluntary desegregation
plans use race as a factor). Cambridge Public Schools list race as a factor, but do not use it. Id. at
52-53. The "vast majority" of schools nationally do not use race as a factor in allocating
students. James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 13 1,
144-45 (2007) ("[E]ven if we accept the highest estimate-that roughly 1,000 school districts
make some use of race when assigning students-that still leaves approximately 15,000 school
districts that do not.").
51. See NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING STUDENTS TO
SCHOOLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME COURT CASES 3 (2007) (discussing
research presented in amicus briefs in Parents Involved and concluding that "[t]he research cited
in the briefs, however, suggests that-although assignments made on the basis of socioeconomic
status are likely to marginally reduce racial isolation and may have other benefits-none of the
proposed alternatives is as effective as race-conscious policies for achieving racial diversity");
Michael J. Kaufman, PICS in Focus: A Majority of the Supreme Court Reaffirms the
Constitutionality of Race-Conscious School Integration Strategies, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1,
16-17 (2007) [hereinafter Kaufman, PICS in Focus] (citing findings from a Department of
Education report that demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the race-neutral, socioeconomic-based
plans from Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, Wake County, North Carolina, San
Francisco, California, Brandywine, Delaware, and La Crosse, Wisconsin); Michael J. Kaufman,
Reading, Writing, and Race: The Constitutionality of Educational Strategies Designed to Teach
Racial Literacy, 41 U. RICH. L. REv. 707, 734-36 (2007) [hereinafter Kaufman, Reading,
Writing, and Race] (discussing several race-neutral methods and their inability to achieve
meaningful desegregation); see also Christina H. Rossell, The Convergence of Black and White
Attitudes on School Desegregation Issues During the Four Decade Evolution of the Plans, 36
WM. & MARY L. REv. 613, 628 (1995) ("In general, only minority students participate ...
because, even today, whites will not voluntarily transfer to schools in minority neighborhoods
without an incentive .... ").
52. San Francisco Unified School District, Student Assignment System, http://portal.
sfusd.edu/template/default.cfm?page=policy.placement.process (last visited Aug. 4, 2008).
53. S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
54. Id. at 1059.
55. STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 49, at 50.
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achievement decline. 56 In short, most voluntary desegregation plans serve an
important symbolic purpose, and the best among them are worthy of
admiration and replication, but both their individual and aggregate effect is
generally small.
Yet, in schools' defense, lower courts have previously rejected various
student assignment plans that rely on race.57 The risk-averse nature of schools
make many unwilling to push the boundaries of these prior cases. Thus, the
meekness, or entire absence in some instances, of desegregation plans may be
more attributable to the courts than the schools.
C. In a Place Where Race Still Matters
Justice Kennedy wrote that "[t]he enduring hope is that race should not
matter; the reality is that too often it does."58 What he did not explore is why
race matters, which raises the question of whether he, like too many others,
simply misunderstands the current motivation for school desegregation.
Desegregated schools are important not because black students sit next to
white students, although significant educational and cultural benefits for both
whites and blacks flow from this interracial exposure.59  Rather, integrated
schools ensure that minority students have access to the basic components of a
quality education: good teachers, adequate school funding, and middle class
peers. Most minority students do not have consistent access to these
56. See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, The Incomplete Desegregation of the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schools and Its Consequences, 1971-2004, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST
THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 87, 88, 91-93 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005).
57. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the use of race as an additional weighing factor in a lottery assignment plan);
Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 791-92 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the consideration of
race in admissions at the Boston Latin School for the purposes of achieving diversity was not
narrowly tailored).
58. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2791 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
59. See, e.g., Derek Black, The Case for the New Compelling Government Interest:
Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923, 943-47 & nn.151-56 (2002) (discussing
numerous research findings of the benefits of racial diversity in education, stating, "[t]hese
benefits include better teaching and learning, improved civic values, increased employment
opportunities, and higher achievement and more educational opportunities" (footnotes omitted));
Joanna R. Zahler, Note, Lessons in Humanity: Diversity as a Compelling State Interest in Public
Education, 40 B.C. L. REV. 995, 1021-28 (1999) (discussing the positive lasting effects of
attending integrated schools on both African American and Caucasian students); see also John
Friedl, Making a Compelling Case for Diversity in College Admissions, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
30-31 (1999) (finding only anecdotal assertions supporting the contention that integrated schools
have lasting beneficial effects on the students who attend them).
60. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The
Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 LAW & INEQ. 269, 282 (2006) ("Schools
of concentrated poverty offer fewer resources, weaker educational preparation, and 'substantially
lower overall achievement levels.' Compounded by racial isolation, segregated schools prevent
access to the social contacts and cultural familiarity 'necessary for career and educational
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components. 61  Not only are public schools racially segregated, they are
unequal. As a general matter, racially isolated minority schools are inadequate
when measured by these components of quality.
Research confirms what is intuitive to the candid observer: quality teachers
are one of the most, if not the most, important factors in the academic success
of students. 62  Although many excellent teachers choose to work in
predominantly minority schools, these schools have too few of these quality
teachers. In terms of experience, higher degrees, and credentials, racially
isolated minority schools tend to have less qualified teachers than
predominantly white schools.63 Similarly, compared with predominantly white
schools, minority schools lack sufficient financial resources and cost more to
operate. 64 As a result of the methods by which states finance schools and the
urban areas where most minority schools are located, racially isolated minority
65schools inevitably have more needs than other schools. Nevertheless,
minority schools receive even less funding to meet these needs. In 2005, for
example, average state spending per pupil in high-minority schools was $877
advancement,' especially for Black children." (footnote omitted) (quoting Jacinda Ma & Michael
Kurlaender, The Future of Race-Conscious Policies in K-12 Public Schools, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK?, supra note 56, at 239, 248)); Sharon
Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 4 (1997) (discussing how a reading of the Supreme Court's integration jurisprudence,
combined with the decision in Brown, is evidence of the Court's acceptance of the notion that
"equality [is] tied to quality").
61. See infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
62. DAN GOLDHABER & EMILY ANTHONY, TEACHER QUALITY AND STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT, EDUC. RESOURCES INFO. CTR. 1 (ERIC Clearinghouse on Urban Educ., Urban
Diversity Series No. 115, 2003) (writing that recent research shows "teacher quality is the most
important educational input predicting student achievement"); STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE,
supra note 49, at 20; UNC CTR. FOR CIv. RTS., THE SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A CRUCIAL CONSIDERATION IN STUDENT ASSIGNMENT POLICY 4 (2005),
available at http://www.law.unc.edu/civilrights/briefs/charlottereport.pdf (discussing research on
the effect good teachers have on student achievement).
63. See ERIC A. HANUSHEK ET AL., WHY PUBLIC SCHOOLS LOSE TEACHERS 12 & tbl.3
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 8599, 2001) (finding in a study of teacher
transfers in Texas "strong evidence that teachers systematically favor higher achieving, non-
minority, non-low income students"); STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 49, at 21;
James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 294 (1999).
64. Ryan, supra note 63, at 284.
65. See, e.g., Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 433-37 (N.J. 1997) (discussing
the unusually high costs inner city schools confront and the untenable position in which it places
them given the school funding structure).
66. CARMEN G. ARROYO, THE FUNDING GAP 1 (The Educ. Trust 2008) available at
http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/5AF8F288-949D-4677-82CF-5A867A8E9153/0/Funding
Gap2007.pdf (listing the funding disparities between districts by race); see also Molly S. McUsic,
The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1351-52 (discussing the higher costs minority districts face and the lower
funds they have to meet them).
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less than the spending in predominantly white schools.6 7  In 2005 in New
York, which has a large number of minority' students, the gap was more than
three times the national average at $2,902.6 Such per pupil gaps accumulate
to create stark differences. For instance, in a moderately sized New York
elementary school of 500 students, the predominantly minority school would
have ap roximately 1.5 million dollars fewer than the predominantly white
school. That amount of money could potentially fund the hiring of enough
teachers to cut classroom sizes nearly in half or double the salaries of many
teachers.70
Finally, racially isolated minority schools tend to have high proportions of
poor students. Some would argue that this fact is more important than any
72other in the success or failure of schools. Regardless of race, the
concentration of poverty in schools jeopardizes students' chances for academic
success. For example, students of all races who attend schools with low levels
of poverty score substantially higher on standardized tests than do students
who attend high-poverty schools. 7 In fact, one study shows that the size of the
67. ARROYO, supra note 66, at 7 tbl.6.
68. See id
69. See id
70. This assumes that the teachers average a salary of no more than $50,000 per year and
that most classrooms average between twenty-five and thirty students. See RESEARCH AND INFO.
SERVS. DEP'T, AM. FED'N OF TEACHERS, SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF TEACHER SALARY TRENDS
2005 3 fig.1 (2007), available at http://www.aft.org/salary/2005/download/AFT2005Salary
Survey.pdf; Eugene M. Lewit & Linda Schuurmann Baker, Class Size, THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN, Winter 1997, at 112, 117 fig.2, available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/
usr doc/vol7no3ART8.pdf.
71. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, A NEW WAY ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION 7 (The Century
Found. 2006) [hereinafter KAHLENBERG, A NEW WAY ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION].
72. See, e.g., id at 6 (summarizing findings that school performance "appears more closely
related to class than race"); John Charles Boger, Education's "Perfect Storm"? Racial
Resegregation, High-Stakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North
Carolina, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1375, 1419 (2003) (discussing findings of a report presented to
Congress highlighting the achievement gap found between students in high-poverty and low-
poverty schools, and noting the disproportionate number of minority students in high-poverty
schools); McUsic, supra note 66, 1335 (2004) (arguing the best way to reach the goal of Brown is
desegregation by economic class); Ryan, supra note 63, at 272-96 (discussing the concentration
of minorities in center-city schools and the fact that such schools are more expensive to run and
tend to be isolated by poverty); Mary Jane Lee, Note, How SheffRevives Brown: Reconsidering
Desegregation's Role in Creating Equal Educational Opportunity, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 485, 518
(1999) ("While they may disagree as to how to 'sort out the respective weights of the effects of
race and class in perpetuating the ... underclass,' it is indisputable that race and class interact."
(footnote omitted)); Alan Gottlieb, Economically Segregated Schools Hurt Poor Kids, Study
Shows, TERM PAPER (Piton Found.), May 2002 (detailing findings of Piton Foundation research,
which "make[] a powerful argument for economic integration of schools").
73. UNC CTR. FOR CIV. RTS., supra note 62, at 2-3; see also JAMES S. COLEMAN, U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 302-10 (1966)
("Attributes of other students [such as poverty] account for far more variation in the achievement
of minority group children than do any attributes of school facilities .... "); KAHLENBERG, A
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achievement gap between high- and low-poverty schools is equivalent to two
years of learning. 74 Similarly, another study found that schools with low levels
of poverty are twenty-two times more likely to be high performing than
75schools with high poverty levels. Moreover, in predicting academic success,
whether one attends a school where the students are wealthy or poor is second
only to whether one's personal socioeconomic status is high or low.
76
Regardless of individual status, students who attend low-poverty schools
77perform better than those who attend high-poverty schools. Thus, as a
general matter, poor students who attend middle-class schools have higher
academic achievement than do middle class students who attend high-poverty
schools.
78
More than 75% of predominantly minority schools are also high-poverty
schools. 79 Thus, these students attend schools where their chances of academic
success are low. Reports show that only 42% of the students who attend
schools composed of 90% minorities graduate on time. From 2004 to 2005
in Baltimore City Public Schools, where nearly three-fourths of the students
were poor and 98% of black students attended predominantly minority schools,
the graduation rate was a beleaguering 34.6%.
This level of racial segregation, concentration of poverty, and inequity of
resources places many school districts in a dangerous position. For instance,
schools' recurring failure to meet the achievement requirements of the No
82Child Left Behind Act threatens their very survival. Their low achievement
NEW WAY ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION, supra note 71, at 6 ("[C]oncentrations of poverty... are
much more likely to adversely affect black students ...." (internal quotation marks omitted));
McUsic, supra note 66, at 1355-56 ("[P]oor students who attend middle-class or wealthy schools
do much better [than those in] poor schools.").
74. Ryan, supra note 63, at 285.
75. DOUGLAS N. HARRIS, ENDING THE BLAME GAME ON EDUCATIONAL INEQUITY 22 &
n.32 (Ariz. St. Univ. Educ. Pol'y Stud. Lab. ed., 2006), available at http://www.asu.edu/
educ/epsl/EPRU/documents/EPSC-0603-120-EPRU.pdf.
76. KAHLENBERG, A NEW WAY ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION, supra note 71, at 6.
77. Id. at 6 ("All students ... perform significantly better in schools with strong middle-
class populations than they do in high poverty schools."); see also UNC CTR. FOR CIv. RTS.,
supra note 62, at I ("[M]iddle-income students who attend high-poverty schools earn lower
average test scores than do low-income students who attend middle class schools.").
78. RUSSELL W. RUMBERGER & GREGORY J. PALARDY, Does Resegregation Matter? The
Impact of Social Composition on Academic Achievement in Southern High Schools, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK?, supra note 56, at 128.
79. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 45, at 13. The manual also noted that "[iln
schools of extreme poverty (in which poor students constitute 90-100% of the population), 80%
of the students are black and Latino." Id.
80. Id. at 16.
81. STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 49, at 19 tbl.3.
82. See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, Failing Schools Strain to Meet U.S. Standard, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2007, at AI ("For chronically failing schools..., the No Child Left Behind law
... prescribes drastic measures .... Barring revisions in the law, [California] state officials
predict that all 6,063 public schools serving poor students will be declared in need of
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has also emboldened the call for the privatization of schools, the creation of
more charter schools, and the extension of school vouchers.83 The funding for
all of these options would likely be extracted from the current public school
funds rather than from increases in the overall expenditures on schools. 84 Of
course, the greatest danger is simply to those students who attend these failing
schools, as they in reality are left behind, kicked out, or streamlined into the
criminal justice system.
All of this is to say that we must do more. We must do far more. The state
of most minority students' educational opportunities in this country is woeful.
Brown called us to confront a similar reality in 1954, but our commitment to
addressing it has waned. Although laudable, a few highly committed school
districts cannot change the overall reality. Likewise, even if the ranks of
voluntarily desegregating schools were to swell, more aggressive efforts will
be necessary. The methods and amounts of school funding must change. The
allocation and assignment of teaching resources must change. And the
widespread assignment of students to economically and racially integrated
schools must occur. Plans that simply wish integration to be so will inevitably
fall short. Moreover, if we do not make these reassignments, race will
continue to matter far more than anyone, regardless of their position on the
ideological spectrum, can tolerate.
D. Before a Court Where Context and Judgment Were Supposed to Matter
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, in several respects,
established a favorable rationale and framework by which to approach the use
of race in primary and secondary public school voluntary desegregation efforts.
In pertinent part, she held in Grutter that race could be used for non-remedial
purposes. 85 Prior to Grutter, the conservative block of the Court and some
lower courts had strongly intimated the contrary-that the state could only use
race to remedy its own past discrimination. 86 Justice O'Connor, however, held
restructuring .... California is not the only state overwhelmed by growing numbers of schools
that cannot satisfy the law's escalating demands.").
83. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 682 n.7, 683 & n.9 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); see also Harry G. Hutchison, Liberal Hegemony? School Vouchers and the Future of
the Race, 68 Mo. L. REV. 559, 592 (2003) (discussing evidence that voucher programs have been
educationally successful for poor African Americans); Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and
States' Duty to Support "Public" Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909, 923 (2007) (discussing the
desegregative effects that voucher-supported, charter, and magnet schools can have).
84. See James Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? Emerging
Evidence from Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 873-74
(discussing the uncertainty of private funding and the increasing number of charter schools
seeking additional public funding rather than supplemental private funding).
85. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
86. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) ("'Absent
searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no
way of determining what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are in
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that institutions of higher education could take race into account to admit a
diverse student body and obtain the educational benefits that flow from it, even
if the institution was not acting to remedy its own past discrimination.
87
Moreover, in approaching the question of whether the interest was compelling
and how an institution may achieve it, she was careful to not step beyond the
role of Supreme Court Justice and into the role of educator or policy-maker.
She deferred to the educational judgment of the university, writing that the
decision of whether to pursue diversity was a "complex educational judgment[]
in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university."" In short,
by holding that the pursuit of diversity is a compelling interest and a judgment
to which the Court should defer, Justice O'Connor established a solid
precedent upon which to recognize a non-remedial compelling interest in
voluntarily desegregating schools.
Proving that the means by which one achieves the compelling interest are
narrowly tailored, however, has routinely been an insurmountable hurdle for
defendants. 89  Responding to this reality, Justice O'Connor has previously
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the
purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.'...
We adhere to that view today .... (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.))); Croson, 488 U.S. at 511 ("Because the city of Richmond
has failed to identify the need for remedial action in the awarding of its public construction
contracts, its treatment of its citizens on a racial basis violates the dictates of the Equal Protection
Clause."); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 273 (5th Cir. 2000) ("The Supreme Court has
conclusively established that the government can, consistent with the Constitution, use racial
preferences under particular circumstances to remedy the present effects of past discrimination.");
see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060,
1096 (1991) (asserting that Croson "limit[ed] the scope of the remedial justification for race-
consciousness"); J.R. Franke, Richmond v. Croson: The Setting Aside of Set-Asides?, 34 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 603, 616 (1990) ("Croson . . . overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that
remedial race-based preferences . . . are permitted. ... ); Cedric Merlin Powell, Hopwood:
Bakke II and Skeptical Scrutiny, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 811, 899-900 (1999) ("The Fifth
Circuit expressed concern that there is no logical stopping point when race-conscious remedial
measures are employed to eradicate societal discrimination.").
87. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("It is true that some language [in prior] opinions might be read
to suggest that remedying past discrimination is the only permissible justification for race-based
governmental action. But we have never held that the only governmental use of race that can
survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination."); id. at 334 ("[A]n admissions program
must be 'flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular
qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration,
although not necessarily according them the same weight.' . . . Universities can ... consider race
or ethnicity more flexibly as a 'plus' factor in the context of individualized consideration of each
and every applicant.").
88. Id. at 328.
89. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38 (remanding the case for determination of
whether the federal set-aside for disadvantaged businesses could pass strict scrutiny); Croson, 488
U.S. at 508 (holding that the city's set-aside for minority contractors could not pass strict
scrutiny); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 791-92 (lst Cir 1998) (holding that the
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defended the Court's strict scrutiny standards from "the notion that strict
scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 90 In Grutter, she dispelled the
notion in practice in addition to word. She began by emphasizing that
"[c]ontext matters." 9' Thus, what narrow tailoring might require in one
context may not be required in another. For instance, the diversity factors that
are applicable in higher education may not be equally applicable in primary
and secondary schools if they do not entail the same competitive, merit-based
application process. 92 Moreover, because narrow tailoring is so demanding, an
appreciation of nuance and relevant differences is paramount.
Yet, regardless of context, narrow tailoring does require the consideration of
whether race-neutral alternatives are available to achieve the compelling
interest. 93 The problem is that inquiries into race-neutral alternatives can be
inherently speculative and susceptible to personal preferences and biases.
Some sort of race-neutral alternative is almost always available, but the
alternatives are not always as effective as race-conscious methods. Moreover,
the alternatives may be more burdensome. When this is the case, the
subjective value that judges place on the compelling interest becomes
important as they are forced to decide the extent to which they are willing to
sacrifice effectiveness and impose burdens on the defendant. The matter
becomes even more acute when the court lacks evidence regarding the
effectiveness of the race-neutral alternatives. A judge might simply conceive
of her own alternatives or entertain the plaintiffs' suggested alternatives
without any real basis for knowing they will be practical or effective.
As to this problem, Justice O'Connor again proceeded paradigmatically.
Recognizing the extent to which the state's interest was in fact compelling and
thus not to be toyed with lightly, she wrote that "[n]arrow tailoring does not
require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral altemative." 94 Rather, it
only requires "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
consideration of race in admissions at the Boston Latin School for the purposes of achieving
diversity was not narrowly tailored).
90. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 ("Strict scrutiny is not
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237)).
91. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
92. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,426 F.3d 1162, 1193 (9th
Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the result) (writing that application of the Supreme Court's
diversity factors to K-12 integration plans is like trying to pound "square pegs" into "round
holes"); Deborah N. Archer, Moving Beyond Strict Scrutiny: The Need for a More Nuanced
Standard of Equal Protection Analysis for K Through 12 Integration Programs, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 629, 651-55 (2007) (explaining why strict scrutiny analysis should not apply to K-12
integration programs given the different context); Liu, supra note 8, at 300-01 ("By contrast, K-
12 school assignment... does not involve merit-based competition.").
93. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171
(1987)).
94. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
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alternatives., 95 Workable does not merely mean conceivable. In her view,
workable means that the alternative would "serve the [compelling] interest
'about as well' 96 and would actually achieve "the compelling interest
sought."97 Justice O'Connor further held that a race-neutral alternative is not
required if that alternative, although able to achieve the compelling interest,
would concurrently undermine some other significant, legitimate interest of the
defendant.
98
For instance, the district court in Grutter determined that the University of
Michigan Law School could have achieved a diverse student body by simply
admitting qualified applicants through a lottery. 99 Under some circumstances,
a lottery would admit more minority students than the current admissions
policy without even considering race. The problem, however, is that a
lottery would also eliminate the consideration of diversity factors other than
race, the individualized consideration of applications, and-most important to
an elite law school-the ability to screen for academic excellence.
Consequently, a lottery system could lower the overall academic credentials of
the school's admitted students.1l 1 Justice O'Connor indicated that narrow
tailoring did not require the University of Michigan Law School to make this
type of sacrifice. 102  In short, "[n]arrow tailoring does not . . .require a
university to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence or
fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all
racial groups."'
0 3
Application of the above principles in a manner consistent with Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Grutter, would portend well for schools that wish to
reduce racial segregation. In fact, given the segregative crisis and its attendant
inequality and inadequacies in primary and secondary schools, the compelling
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986)).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 340.
99. Id.
100. For instance, at a school attempting to raise its average LSAT score and deciding to only
admit students with LSAT scores above 160, even if race were a factor in admissions, the number
of minorities would be limited based on the disproportionately small percentage of minorities
who score above 160 on the LSAT. See SUSAN P. DALESSANDRO ET AL., LAW SCH. ADMISSION
COUNCIL, LSAT PERFORMANCE WITH REGIONAL, GENDER, AND RACIAL/ETHNIC
BREAKDOWNS: 1993-1994 THROUGH 1999-2000 TESTING YEARS 16, fig.14 (2000), available at
http://www.Isacnet.org/research/LSAT-performance-regional-gender-racial-ethnic-breakdowns-
1993-1994-through-I 999-2000.pdf. If that same school implemented a lottery among all
qualified applicants (those with LSATs above 150 for instance), a larger number of minorities
would be admitted based on their more proportional representation in that range. Thus, in this
scenario, a race-blind lottery system would admit more minorities than the race-conscious system
that sought only the highest scoring students.
101. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
102. See id. (describing the suggestion that the school lower standards as a "drastic remedy").
103. Id. at 339.
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interest in desegregating public schools would presumably exceed the interest
in obtaining the added benefits of diversity in an elite law school.
10 4
Moreover, to the extent that primary and secondary schools pursue racial
desegregation or the elimination of racial isolation, and not general diversity,
race is the most effective means by which to achieve those interests. If the
interests were in fact compelling, it would be inconsistent to demand that a
school use flimsier, less effective means to achieve them. Under Justice
O'Connor's rationale in Grutter, narrow tailoring would not require a school to
use a race-neutral alternative that, even if effective, would force a school to
choose between achieving desegregation and maintaining a central aspect of
the school system, such as neighborhood schools or the ability to choose where
to send one's children.
III. KENNEDY'S VISION OF DESEGREGATION: TURNING THE WORLD UPSIDE
DOwN?
The question of how Parents Involved may have modified Grutter is purely
a legal one, but how Parents Involved will affect the future of voluntary
desegregation is a practical function of where school districts (or at least the
most ambitious school districts) are trying to take their schools. Justice
Kennedy's opinion provides guideposts, but only the unilateral impetus of
school districts makes his opinion relevant. Thus, schools, rather than Justice
Kennedy, will determine the future of desegregation. Moreover, his opinion
contains enough ambiguity that schools can, to the extent they are willing to
pursue earnest desgregation, test or expand its bounds. Nevertheless, Justice
Kennedy's opinion does impose significant constraints on school districts that
take a serious approach to desegregation.
The basic holding in Parents Involved is that, although schools have a
compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation or seeking diversity, their use of
race is restricted to two methods. First, they can use race in a general way:
through the selection of school sites, the redrawing of attendance zones, and
through other policies that do not rely on individual classifications of students
by race. 05 Second, if race is to be used regarding individual students, it can
104. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Lynn's asserted
interests bear a strong familial resemblance to those that the Grutter Court found compelling.
There is no reason to believe that these interests . . . are substantially stronger in the context of
higher education .... In fact, there is significant evidence in the record that the benefits of a
racially diverse school are more compelling at younger ages.").
105. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("School boards may pursue the
goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through other means,
including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs;
recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and
other statistics by race.").
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only be one of multiple factors.' 0 6 Moreover, Justice Kennedy sees this use of
race as being for the pursuit of diversity.'0 7 Thus, the schools must make
nuanced decisions analogous to those authorized in Grutter. s08 As Justice
Kennedy wrote in the context of primary and secondary schools, "[r]ace may
be one component of ... diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special
talents and needs, should also be considered."' 0 9
Beyond these very basic statements, however, Justice Kennedy's opinion
fails to provide schools with any substantive guidance as to exactly how they
might desegregate without violating strict scrutiny. The opinion speaks with a
certain level of clarity as to what schools cannot do, but is unclear as to what
they can do.'' 0 It simply posits the general options listed above without really
examining whether these options might, in practice, produce desegregation or
make the pursuit of desegregation so burdensome that it is unsustainable.
Thus, the opinion does not contemplate the likelihood that these hypothetical
options will prove ineffective.
A. Moving Away from Grutter's Approach
Justice Kennedy's opinion, although asserting its consistency with Grutter,
actually moves the Court's jurisprudence away from the principles established
in Grutter. First, although Justice O'Connor emphasizes in Grutter that
"[c]ontext matters" and relevant differences must be taken into account,
1 1
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved is largely oblivious to this
point. He fails to account for, in any meaningful way, the differences between
K-12 public school districts and institutions of higher education, namely that
(1) these public schools do not assign students based on academic merit while
institutions of higher education do, (2) individualized consideration is the
hallmark of higher education admissions, but generally irrelevant in primary
and secondary school assignments, and (3) all students under these plans are
assigned to a quality elementary or secondary school, whereas no provision is
made for students denied admission to an institution of higher education.
1 2
Ignoring these differences, Justice Kennedy's narrow-tailoring analysis
approaches the case as though the schools were pursuing diversity rather than
106. Id. at 2793 ("[T]he small number of assignments affected [by the use of express racial
classifications] suggests that the schools could have achieved their stated ends through ... a more
nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might include race
as a component.").
107. See id. at 2792-93.
108. Id. at 2793.
109. Id. at 2797.
110. STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 49, at 3.
111. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
112. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2794 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
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avoiding racial isolation and making it possible to provide equitable
educational opportunities. 13 Thus, in his analysis, context does not matter.
Second, Justice Kennedy's opinion requires schools to make the type of
sacrifice that Justice O'Connor indicated was unnecessary in Grutter. The
student assignment plans in Parents Involved were choice plans that allowed
students (and by extension, parents) to rank schools by preference and,
consequently, allowed parents to exercise control over where their children
attended school. 115 Only when a school became oversubscribed did race
become a factor in assignments. 116 Thus, the school districts did not simply
assign students to schools based on race. Rather, the plans primarily
accommodated parental choice, including the choice to send children to their
neighborhood school. 117  Moreover, the availability of student and parental
choice may be the most important factor in the success of such desegregation
plans. The element of choice has made voluntary desegregation plans popular
and allowed them to succeed whereas community resistance has caused many
mandatory desegregation plans to fail.' 18 In short, choice is at the very heart
and mission of the assignment plans in Parents Involved.
Justice Kennedy's opinion, however, effectively asks the schools to choose
between maintaining choice and pursuing desegregation. Justice Kennedy
intimiates that, if schools want to use race in anything other than a very general
way, it must be in the pursuit of diversity and include the consideration of
multiple other factors.'1 9 Although schools could certainly increase diversity
on a number of criteria by employing such a plan, there is little guarantee that
113. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
114. Compare Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (stating that the "schools could have achieved their stated ends
through different means"), with Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (indicating that a university does not
have "to choose between" maintaining academic excellence and increasing diversity).
115. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746-47 (plurality opinion).
116. 1dat2747.
117. Id. at 2747-50 (discussing Seattle's use of race as the second of three tiebreakers when
assigning students to schools, and Jefferson County's use of race when a student listed a racially
imbalanced school as his preference and that student's race would contribute to the school's racial
imbalance).
118. See Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown's Goal of Educational Equity
in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 179-81, 193 (2005) (discussing southern
resistance to state-imposed desegregation after Brown and how voluntary desegregation plans are
able to avoid the problems of state imposed mandatory plans); see also RICHARD D.
KAHLENBERG, RESCUING BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: PROFILES OF TWELVE SCHOOL
DISTRICTS PURSUING SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION 5 (The Century Found.
2007), available at http://www.tcf.org/publications/education/districtprofiles.pdf. [hereinafter
KAHLENBERG, RESCUING BROWN] (indicating most successful districts rely on choice in
assigning students); Ryan, supra note 63, at 309-13 (discussing the potential for integration plans
to be successful).
119. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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significant, if any, desegregation would also occur. Justice Kennedy's opinion
does not address this outcome, presumably because schools also have the
option of using race in a general way to redraw attendance zones and enact
other similar measures. Such options have produced desegregation in the
past, but they require school districts to take away parental choice. Under
such plans, parents must send their children to the school that the district
designates for them, including ones outside their neighborhoods to which they
may object. 122 Parents in the past have resisted mandatory assignment plans.1
2 3
If experience is any indicator, compulsory school assignment plans would
obliterate the widespread support for desegregation and make voluntary124
desegregation short-lived. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's opinion ignores
the significance of this double-bind and asked schools to make choices that
Grutter would not.
Placing schools in this position after affirmatively recognizing that they have
a compelling interest suggests a bias or ambivalence toward the case. If
diversity or desegregation were important enough to be compelling, one would
not necessarily expect a court to make the interest so difficult to attain.
However, the explanation is likely two-fold. First, Justice Kennedy is simply
suspicious of these plans and, second, he thinks he knows best how to solve
these and other problems. His suspicion of race-conscious plans in general is
120. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
121. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1971)
(affirming the reassignment of students to different schools through altered attendance zones);
Liddell v. Bd. of Educ. of St. Louis, 667 F.2d 643, 650 (8th Cir. 1981) (affirming a mandatory
desegregation plan that required reassignment of students); Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 377 F. Supp. 1123 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (allowing the reassignment of 9,000 students via
busing), aff'd511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1975).
122. See, e.g., Michael Besso, Sheff v. O'Neill: The Connecticut Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics, 22 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 165, 187-88 (2003) (comparing the successful school attendance
zoning plans enacted in Connecticut by Stamford and New Haven with Bridgeport, which failed
because of protests).
123. See, e.g., Regan Garner, Essay, A School Without a Name: Desegregation of Eastside
High School 1970 -1987, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 233, 235 (2005) ("[M]andatory busing
and the redrawing of attendance zones . . . were rejected by the mostly white middle-class
families who were unwilling to abandon their neighborhood schools for what they considered to
be academically inferior institutions.").
124. See KAHLENBERG, RESCUING BROWN, supra note 118, at 5 (predicting that any
compulsory reassignment will likely "face opposition from some middle-class parents who
believe that with their home selection, they have 'purchased' the right to send their children to
economically homogeneous neighborhood public schools"); see also Zahler, supra note 59, at
1028-29 ("Virtually all research on school desegregation and white flight indicates that school
desegregation significantly accelerates white flight in most school districts in the year of
implementation if the desegregation plan involves mandatory school reassignments."); Davison
M. Douglas, The End of Busing?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1715, 1725 (1995) (reviewing GARY
ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION (1996)) (discussing research indicating that although most Americans favored
desegregation, they were against school reassignments that required busing).
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best demonstrated by his dissent in Grutter. There, Justice Kennedy offered no
express indication that he objects in principle to diversity or racially related
goals, but he suggested that he thought Michigan was lying about why they
were using race and how they were using it.' He saw Michigan's plan as
nothing less than an attempt to "allow[] racial minorities to have their special
circumstances considered in order to improve their educational
opportunities. ' 26 In his opinion, the university's asserted interest in diversity
"'is merely the current rationale of convenience for a policy that they prefer to
justify on other grounds."" 127 Although the law school testified to the contrary,
he was convinced that the school was consulting its daily reports of admissions
for no reason "save for race itself."' 128 Contrary to Justice O'Connor, 129 he
concluded that race was not used as "one modest factor among many others to
achieve diversity."'' 30 Instead, he thought it was the "predominant factor."
'131
A similar suspicion, although not as pronounced, is evident below the
surface of Justice Kennedy's analysis in Parents Involved. As previously
discussed, he prefaces his analysis by emphasizing that the schools shoulder
the burden of justifying their use of race. Moreover, he asserted that a less
forgiving review of the record suggests that not only did the schools fail to
present evidence to justify their plans, the school districts had affirmatively
used race in an inappropriate manner.' 33  However, insofar as the school
districts are attempting to desegregate rather than pursue diversity, Justice
Kennedy's assumption of impropriety may be born more out of skewed
perception than any real basis in fact.
Justice Kennedy does not simply rest on his suspicion; he proceeds to insert
his judgment for that of the schools. He admits that "[flifty years of
experience since Brown v. Board of Education should teach us that the
problem [of school segregation] defies so easy a solution."'134 Yet, his decision
effectively purports to know how to create such a solution. 135 If the deficiency
in the case was merely a failure to explore race-neutral alternatives, he could
have remanded the case to the trial court to determine the availability and
effectiveness of any potential alternatives. Instead, he supposes that the
125. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389-91 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 395.
127. Id. at 393 (quoting Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 34 (2002)).
128. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 391-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 334 (majority opinion).
130. Id. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2789
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
133. Id. at 2790.
134. Id. at 2791 (citation omitted).
135. See id. at 2792 (noting various means of achieving diversity in schools).
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schools can desegregate through diversity programs or other policies that do
not involve individual racial classifications.' But Justice Kennedy has no
basis in fact for believing these policies will work. 137 That he encourages
schools to collaborate with experts to design plans almost belies the fact that he
is merely assuming workable alternatives exist. 138  Moreover, making this
assumption is an affront to schools that presumably would have had to have
been either unaware of these alternatives or incorrectly dismissed them. In
short, Justice Kennedy assumes that he knows best: general or race-neutral
plans will work if schools just work harder.
B. The Purpose of Desegregation
The constraints in Justice Kennedy's opinion are also a product of a
fundamental misunderstanding as to the very nature and purpose of school
desegregation. Schools theoretically might take race into account for various
purposes. They might seek to avoid racially isolated schools and the
associated negative educational impacts, to increase school safety, to improve
parental support of schools, to help reduce residential segregation, to create
stability within the school system, or to obtain the citizenship, educational, and
interracial benefits of diversity.1 39  Not perceiving any distinction between
these interests, some courts have attempted to reduce or combine these various
interests into a single one, which they label as an interest in diversity or in the
educational benefits of diversity. 14  The First Circuit Court of Appeals, for
instance, asserted that the educational benefits of diversity are but the
corollary, or flip-side, of avoiding the harmful effects of racial isolation. 141
Although these interests are closely related, it does not follow that they are
the same or can easily be couched under a single umbrella. 42 Likewise, it is
136. See id
137. See id. (noting that schools "are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the
problem in a general way").
138. See id. at 2797.
139. See STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 49, at 28 (listing the other compelling
interests that might motivate a school system to voluntarily desegregate). The school district in
Comfort v. Lynn had several motivations for its voluntary desegregation plan. See Comfort ex rel.
Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 375 (D. Mass. 2003), affd 418 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2005). The school district articulated its compelling interests as fostering "racial and ethnic
diversity, increasing educational opportunities for all students, improving the quality of
education[,] ensuring student safety,. . . reducing minority isolation," and providing an education
to all students that satisfies federal and state constitutional requirements. Id. To solidify these
benefits, the school system also incorporated a diversity curriculum in its schools. Id. at 349.
140. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Although there
are some differences between these interests, we conclude that they are essentially two sides of
the same coin .... We therefore restate the interests at stake here as obtaining the educational
benefits of a racially diverse student body.").
141. Id.
142. See Liu, supra note 8, at 282 (indicating that it is "clear there are two general goals that
can be distinguished").
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not entirely accurate to categorize all efforts that increase student body
diversity as engaging in voluntary desegregation. Some schools surely wish to
pursue diversity, but other schools, if not most, that use race in assigning
students need to change the demographic characteristics of their individual
schools because it is the best hope they have of providing equitable and
adequate educational opportunities for their minority students.
As discussed above, racially isolated minority schools pose barriers to
academic success, many of which are the very product of their racial and
143socioeconomic isolation, not their lack of exposure to diversity. School
systems that realize, care about, and have the demographic capacity to change
this isolation pursue voluntary desegregation because it is the best method to
alleviate these barriers and further a modicum of equality with their schools.
Although various schools have achieved academic success notwithstanding
these barriers, 44 their success is not consistently replicable and is rarely
sustained over the long term.145 Desegregation is simply their best option.
Of course various benefits, including those that flow from diversity
exposure, will accompany this desegregation, but those benefits are distinct
146from avoiding the harmful effects of racial isolation and achieving equity.
In essence, voluntary desegregation is primarily about school districts keeping
their heads above water as opposed to drowning. Moreover, by keeping their
heads above water, they have a fair chance at swimming to shores of success.
The other benefits, such as diversity, are what one might call added benefits
that only have significance once a school district has made it to shore. This
analogy is appropriate because the lingering, tragic reality in our schools is that
so long as schools can be identified as white or black, resources, preferences,
and quality teachers will gravitate toward white schools and many parents will
seek to avoid, if not run from, black schools. 147 Thus, breaking this inequity
143. See discussion supra Part II.C.
144. See, e.g., Marcelle S. Fischler, Battling Stereotypes with High Test Scores, N.Y. TIMES
(Long Island ed.), Feb. 20, 2005, at sec.14, p.1 (noting the success of Elmont Memorial High
School, a predominantly minority high school).
145. See Michael Dobbs, Progress Made in City's Schools, but More to Go, WASH. POST,
May 13, 2004 at Al (noting that maintaining diversity and success is often complicated by
various factors); Alan Green et al., Reflecting on the Gap: What can the Implementation of an
Urban School Counseling Project Teach Us about the Achievment Gap?, 2 E-J. OF TEACHING &
LEARNING IN DIVERSE SETTINGS (2004), http://www.subr.edu/coeducation/ejoumal/Green
%20et%20al.%20Article.htm (indicating the difficulty in replicating various remedial strategies).
146. Liu, supra note 8, at 282-99 (identifying that preventing racial isolation and educational
equity are each compelling interests).
147. See, e.g., Joe R. Feagin & Bernice McNair Barnett, Success and Failure: How Systemic
Racism Trumped the Brown v. Board of Education Decision, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1099, 1110
("From the beginning, black parents and community leaders sought desegregation primarily to
secure greater access to educational and related socioeconomic resources .... The assumption
has always been that better school resources come in racially desegregated schools .... In
general, these assumptions have been correct."); Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The
Black-White Test Score Gap: Why It Persists and What Can Be Done, THE BROOKINGS
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requires breaking this racial paradigm. 148 Diversity curricula and interracial
contact can break this paradigm slowly over time by diminishing the relevance
of race, 149 but the most effective way to break it for today's children, and in a
way that offers equitable school opportunities, is to eliminate racially
identifiable schools by desegregating the student bodies. Race-conscious
student assignments do this.
C. Confusing Desegregation with Diversity
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved, however, misses the
fundamental point of desegregation, and thus fails to distinguish it from
diversity. This mistake is the lynchpin of an opinion that ultimately creates
new barriers for school systems that can ill afford them. Justice Kennedy does
not conceptualize the schools' interest as an interest in alleviating the
sometimes-devastating effects of racially isolated schools. Instead, he
primarily conceptualizes the case as being about the pursuit of diversity and its
educational benefits. The very first sentence of his opinion belies this point:
The Nation's schools strive to teach that our strength comes from
people of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in the
commitment to the freedom of all. In these cases two school districts
in different parts of the country seek to teach that principle by having
INSTITUTION, Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1998spring_
educationjencks.aspx ("Predominantly white schools seem to attract more skilled teachers than
black schools .. "); Jay Mathews, Top Teachers Rare in Poor Schools, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
2002, at A5 (discussing the dearth of high quality teachers in low income schools).
148. See Liu, supra note 8, at 294. As Liu writes, "besides affecting student achievement
when all else is equal from school to school, school racial composition explains why all else is
not equal from school to school." Id.
149. See id. at 289 ("A school in Louisville that is two-thirds black and one-third white may
offer a suitable environment for interracial contact that dispels stereotypes and teaches children of
different races to treat each other with respect. But the socialization goals of school integration
go beyond cultivating harmony in interpersonal relations. A critical part of what it means to be
educated for citizenship in a multiracial society is to understand racial dynamics as a social not
merely interpersonal phenomenon, shaped not only by individual attitudes and prejudices but also
by the demographic structure of the surrounding community."); Molly Townes O'Brien, Brown
on the Ground: A Journey of Faith in Schooling, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 813, 836 (2004) ("The peer-
effect and networking effect of interracial contact would produce interracial ties and affinities that
were not part of the program of values being formally or informally conveyed by the teachers and
the school structure. These peer and networking effects may have profoundly transformative
effects on individual children."); john a. powell, The Tensions Between Integration and School
Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655, 685 (2001) ("The Institute on Race and Poverty
conducted a qualitative study that demonstrates many more benefits of an integrated environment
than achievement, such as school enjoyment, increased understanding among students, improved
student teacher relationships, greater interracial understanding, increased interracial interaction
later in life, and better preparation for a diverse work world.").
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classrooms that reflect the racial makeup of the surrounding
community. 
150
Thus, from the outset, he positions the case as being about diversity and
multicultural values.
Only on the last page of his opinion does Justice Kennedy acknowledge,
although only in word, that diversity and avoiding racial isolation are two
distinct compelling interests. 51 This minor acknowledgment, however, is far
outweighed by the remaining entirety of the opinion that obfuscates the
existence of any interest other than that of diversity. In particular, his narrow-
tailoring analysis addresses the schools' plans solely from the perspective of
diversity as a compelling interest. 52  He also indicates race is only one
component of diversity and schools must engage in an individualized review
that takes into account how each student might contribute to a school's overall
diversity.1 53  Furthermore, he explicitly writes that this consideration of
"student characteristics" should "be informed by Grutter," where the
educational benefits of diversity, rather than desegregation, were the goal. 1
54
Thus, the glaring gap in his opinion is the absence of a discussion of why any
factor other than race would be relevant to student assignments when the
explicit goal is the elimination of racial isolation-not the attainment of the
educational benefits of diversity. As for schools that wish to eliminate racial
isolation, the most his opinion facially concedes is that they can desegregate by
using race in a eneral way, so long as it does not involve individual racial
classifications.
Justice Kennedy's strategic use of the Court's past desegregation cases
suggests that his focus on diversity as a compelling interest, to the exclusion of
racial isolation, may not be inadvertent. 56 Rather than merely misinterpreting
precedent, Justice Kennedy uses the Court's desegregation precedent in a
manner that imports his ideological notions into that precedent: that race
should only be used in the rarest of occasions and in the most minimal of ways.
In any event, his opinion misrepresents school desegregation precedent by
150. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2788 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
151. Id. at2797.
152. Id. at2789.
153. Id. at 2792-94, 2797.
154. Id. at 2793; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2002).
155. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 ("If school authorities are concerned that the
student-body compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal
educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to
address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion solely
on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.").
156. See id at 2791-94.
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implying that the Court's school desegregation and strict scrutiny
jurisprudence are part of a single coherent body of law.
1 57
School desegregation cases have previously been distinct from strict scrutiny
cases. 58 None of the Court's past school desegregation cases have approached
the mandate of school desegregation from the perspective of whether a
compelling interest existed to justify the use of race-conscious remedies, nor
did the cases concem themselves with narrow tailoring. Those types of
concerns are the exclusive domain of strict scrutiny. In fact, the primary
concerns the Court has expressed in its desegregation cases are inapposite to
those of strict scrutiny. The Court's initial concern in desegregation cases was
that schools were not acting aggressively enough to desegregate
immediately. 159 In fact, part of that concern was over the schools' ineffective
race-neutral desegregation plans.' 60 The only aspect of desegregation that
bears any resemblance to strict scrutiny or narrow tailoring is the Court
guarding against the possibility that lower courts might overreach in their
authority to compel desegregation and order an overbroad remedy.' 61 This
concern, however, was not one-sided. The Court was likewise clear that lower
courts must not allow schools to shirk their desegregation duty through under-
inclusive remedies. 162  Although the Court was concerned with a tailoring of
sorts there, the concern is a general one of the institutional authority and
responsibility of courts, not any specific concern as to race-conscious
remedies. Moreover, this is a concern in regard to the courts, not the school
districts.
For instance, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, the Court wrote that "the
nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." 163  The lower
court had ordered the school district to adopt what some might consider
aggressive desegregation methods.' 64  The issue before the Court was the
157. In all fairness, Justice Kennedy is not alone in Parents Involved in attempting to situate
school desegregation cases and remedies within the context and jurisprudence of strict scrutiny.
The plurality took the same position. See id. at 2764.
158. Archer, supra note 92, at 639-40.
159. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) ("School boards such
as the respondent then operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.").
160. See id at 441-42 (finding that the race-neutral "freedom of choice" assignment plan had
done next to nothing to desegregate the schools).
161. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489-92 (1992) (discussing the scope and limits
of district court powers in ordering desegregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (cautioning that "judicial authority does not put judges automatically
in the shoes of school authorities").
162. See Green, 391 U.S. at 439 (discussing the district courts' responsibilities in school
desegregation).
163. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
164. See id. at 8-10 (recounting the plan the district court ordered). The Court noted:
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extent to which courts could place such requirements on schools.' 65 The Court
held that desegregation orders could be broad and include thin 6 s as
burdensome as mandatory busing and redrawing attendance zones. In
Swann, these aggressive remedies were appropriate because the segregation
had been so harmful and extensive.167 This concern with congruity, however,
is again solely in respect to the power of the courts.
When the Court has directed its attention toward a school district's power to
desegregate, the Court's concern with limitations or narrow tailoring has not
been evident. To the contrary, the Court's only comments as to a school's
power indicate that the school's power significantly exceeds that of the courts:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well
conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of
Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a
whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a
constitutional violation, however, that would not be within the
authority of a federal court.1
68
For some of those same reasons, when addressing a ballot initiative that
attempted to prohibit integrative busing in the state of Washington, the Court
held that the power to address segregation in the schools was within the proper
power of the local school board and could not be abrogated.169 Moreover, the
Court expressed no concern that the school district was attempting to remedy
de facto segregation. The distinction between de facto and de jure segregation
is only meaningful insofar as a court seeks to mandate desegregation, with
"Like the board plan, the Finger plan does as much by rezoning school attendance
lines as can reasonably be accomplished. However, unlike the board plan, it does not
stop there. It goes further and desegregates all the rest of the elementary schools by the
technique of grouping two or three outlying schools with one black inner city school;
by transporting black students from grades one through four to the outlying white
schools; and by transporting white students from the fifth and sixth grades from the
outlying white schools to the inner city black school."
Under the Finger plan, nine inner-city Negro schools were grouped in this manner
with 24 suburban white schools.
Id. at 9-10 (quoting the district court).
165. Id. at 5.
166. Id. at 30.
167. See id. at 11, 14, 16; see also Rogers M. Smith, Black and White After Brown:
Constructions of Race in Modern Supreme Court Decisions, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 709, 724
(2003) (identifying Swann as one of the Court's "most aggressive desegregation decisions").
168. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
169. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982).
170. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 196 (1973) ("The District Court used those
figures to signify educationally inferior schools, and there is no suggestion in the record that those
same figures were or would be used to define a 'segregated' school in the de jure context"); see
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the concern again being in regard to the court's authority, not a school's. In
short, the Court's desegregation jurisprudence has never been concerned with
school districts taking aggressive race-conscious measures to desegregate
because their actions were obviously taken in the best of faith and for the best
of reasons.
Although Justice Kennedy's opinion at one point rightly conceded that the
"primary function" of the "distinction between dejure and defacto segregation
* . . in school cases was to delimit the powers of the Judiciary," the opinion
immediately asserts that the principle still "serves as a limit on the exercise of
a power" by desegregating schools. 171 As to the second point, however, his
sole citation is to affirmative action cases, not school desegregation cases.17
2
To obscure this gap in precedent, he attempts to present Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education173 as an example of the Court distinguishing between de
facto and de jure segregation, and affirmatively prohibiting a school's
consideration of race because it was attempting to remedy de facto rather than
de jure segregation.
175
Justice Kennedy is correct that the case did not involve de jure segregation.
Had de jure segregation been present, the case would not have even been
before the Court, as the race-conscious remedy would have clearly been
appropriate. What Justice Kennedy papered over is the fact that the school
district was not attempting to remedy de facto segregation either. Instead, the
school had implemented what amounted to an affirmative action plan to retain
more minority teachers during a period of teacher lay offs. 176  Thus, strict
scrutiny applied and the school was obliged to justify the policy with a
also Kevin Brown, The Road Not Taken in Brown: Recognizing the Dual Harm of Segregation,
90 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1586-87 (2004) ("The state action requirement of the Equal Protection
Clause created a need to draw a distinction between de jure segregation and de facto
segregation."); Donald E. Lively, Desegregation and the Supreme Court: The Fatal Attraction of
Brown, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 649, 675 (1993) ("To the extent stigmatization is a function of
racial separation, no real difference exists with respect to whether segregation is characterized as
dejure or de facto.").
171. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2795-96
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
172. See id at 2796 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
173. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
174. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
175. See id. (using Wygant as an example of the distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation and suggesting that the school's actions were prohibited because it was attempting to
remedy de facto segregation rather than de jure).
176. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270. The school board and the teachers union in this case
agreed to a lay-off provision in their collective bargaining agreement that provided that in the
event of teacher layoffs the school district would retain teachers by seniority, but that in no event
would the school lay off a greater percentage of minority teachers than were employed at the time
of the layoffs. Id
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compelling interest. 7 7  The school, however, did not respond that it was
desegregating or that this was part of an effort to desegregate. Rather, it
argued that it had a compelling interest in creating minority role models. 178 If
this were a desegregation case, the context and analysis would have been
entirely different. Thus, Justice Kennedy's opinion lacks any solid precedent
to support his notion that the Court has limited schools' efforts to redress de
facto segregation.
Justice Kennedy's opinion, nevertheless, attempts to transform school
desegregation cases and their distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation into a jurisprudence that was guided by the principles of strict
scrutiny. In doing so, he misrepresents the nature of segregation, the harm that
occurred, and the efforts to address it. In a section of his opinion devoted
exclusively to desegregation jurisprudence, he indicated he would address two
points: "the difference between de jure and de facto segregation [and] the
presumptive invalidity of a State's use of racial classifications." 79  He then
asserted that the presumptive invalidity of racial classifications could only be
overcome if schools used desegregation to rectify de jure segregation.' 80 He
further characterizes traditional desegregative measures as a "resort to
extraordinary measures including individual student and teacher assignment to
schools based on race."'18' In his estimation, these race-conscious measures
were only used because the schools "had no choice."'
8 2
These appraisals of desegregation are flawed on significant accounts. First,
race classifications were the status quo at the time of Brown and during the
ensuing years. 83 To the extent any question was raised as to their use it was
not one of presumptive invalidity, but whether they were used to integrate or
segregate. 84  It is disingenuous to suggest that, when schools used racial
classifications or other race-conscious measures to undo the evil and continued
existence of segregation, courts had to be mindful to ensure schools did not
misuse race. Quite plainly, the courts' task was nothing more or less than the
elimination of racialized and segregated schools, which required the
consideration of race. But race-conscious desegregation is far from the
equivalent of classifying students for the purpose of segregating them and
177. See id. at 279-80.
178. Id. at 274.
179. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2794 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
180. See id at 2795.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REv. 985, 997-1001 (2007) (describing the "status quo of stark
racial hierarchy" along with theories seeking to justify racism in the first half of the nineteenth
century).
184. See id. at 1001 -03.
185. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435-36 (1968).
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granting preference and privilege to one race of students over another. One
simply cannot equate the use of race to fulfill "a moral and ethical obligation
... to creat[e] an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its
children"' 86 with the "separat[ion of African Americans] from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race" so as to "generate[] a
feeling of inferiority."'
187
Second, race-based remedies in school desegregation were not extraordinary
at all. Rather, the original act of segregating students by law was an
extraordinary act that demanded a specific, responsive remedy, not as a matter
of last resort, but as a basic necessity of equity. 188 For that reason, courts and
schools used these measures frequently and without misgivings. Race-based
remedies were the routine tool of desegregation. 189 Justice Kennedy writes
that the "allocation of benefits and burdens through individual racial
classifications was found sometimes permissible in the context of remedies for
dejure wrong,'19° but this statement reflects an attempt to revise precedent in a
manner consistent with Justice Kennedy's personal distaste for racial
classifications. It simply lacks any basis in the Court's desegregation
jurisprudence. In short, to suggest these desegregative actions were or should
be a last resort, and are somehow evils that would have otherwise been
avoided, casts aspersions toward what may be the most important work the
courts and schools have ever undertaken in the service, not the confrontation,
of equal protection. Desegregation does not equal race discrimination or race
preference, nor does it now or ever in the past implicate strict scrutiny.
D. A More Forgiving Interpretation
Notwithstanding the preceding critique, an alternative reading of Justice
Kennedy's opinion is plausible. One could read the opinion more narrowly
and interpret it as merely responding to the particular evidence before the
Court rather than an opinion that establishes principles that constrain all school
districts. From the outset, Justice Kennedy's opinion indicates that the
govemment bears the burden of justifying its use of individual race
classifications.19 1  Justice Kennedy finds that the schools established a
186. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
187. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
188. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38 (writing that "[tihe constitutional rights of Negro school
children articulated in Brown I permit no less than" commanding schools "to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch.").
189. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971) (finding
that the use of racial ratios is the "starting point" in assessing the effectiveness of desegregation
plans and making decisions about where to reassign students).
190. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (first emphasis added).
191. Id. at 2789.
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compelling interest, but he finds they failed to carry their burden as to narrow
tailoring.192 He does not, however, hold that this burden could not have been
carried. 193 Given different evidence, some other school might be able to justify
the use of race in assignment plans similar to Louisville and Seattle's.
Justice Kennedy's narrow-tailoring analysis focused on whether race-neutral
alternatives were available. He found that the schools simply failed to
demonstrate that they had pursued these alternatives and that they were
ineffective. 194 In fact, he went so far as to say that "a less forgiving reading of
the record would suggest" that Louisville used race in an "ad hoc manner."'
195
As the school districts failed to demonstrate otherwise, he posited other race-
neutral methods were available to the schools.' 96 However, if another school
district demonstrated that it had exhausted race-neutral alternatives and
determined that a race-conscious plan similar to Seattle or Louisville's was the
only workable option for obtaining desegregated schools, Justice Kennedy's
opinion would not prohibit the plan. From this perspective, his opinion was
not a repudiation of race-conscious plans per se, but merely a repudiation of
the failure to justify the plans.
In addition, Justice Kennedy rejects the far more conservative approach of
the plurality. He refuses to be the fifth vote on specific principles that are
significant if for no other reason than for their rhetorical value. On these
principles, he lends some modest hope for the future of desegregation. He
writes: "The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too
often it does. . . . The plurality's postulate that '[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race' is not sufficient to decide these cases."' 197 He further concludes that
although we must aspire for "'[o]ur Constitution [to be] color-blind,' . . . [i]n
the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional
principle."'
' 98
For those reasons, he is unwilling to hamstring schools to the extent that the
plurality would. He permits the schools to use race in a diversity based
approach and in a general way that does not classify individuals.' By
contrast, the plurality argues that these school districts cannot use race at all,
because in the absence of a duty to remedy past intentional segregation, their
192. See id. at 2789-90.
193. See id. at 2790.
194. - See id. at 2790, 2792.
195. Id. at 2790.
196. Id. at 2792 (He suggests that race-neutral measures could include "strategic site
selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with [attention to] demographics; allocating
resources for special programs; [and] recruiting students and faculty ... .
197. Id. at 2791 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
198. Id. at 2791-92 (first alteration in original).
199. ld. at 2792.
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current actions are no more than racial balancing in an attempt to "remedy[]
past societal discrimination. 2 °0 Justice Kennedy responds that:
School districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal
educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least open to the
interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore
the problem of defacto resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse
that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the
Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must
accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view,
profoundly mistaken.
20 1
Thus, although Justice Kennedy would subject these schools' race-conscious
desegregation remedies to strict scrutiny, he would permit these remedies
under some circumstances, while the plurality would permit none.
20
2
Moreover, if schools only use race in a general way that does not classify
individual students, he would not even subject them to strict scrutiny.
20 3
Unfortunately, this narrow reading of Justice Kennedy's opinion is still
constrained by the other parts of his opinion that mischaracterize desegregation
precedent and impose a diversity-based analysis on voluntary desegregation.
His encouraging comments are largely just that. They may rhetorically soften
200. Id. at 2758-59 (plurality opinion). The plurality argues:
Jefferson County phrases its interest as "racial integration," but integration certainly
does not require the sort of racial proportionality reflected in its plan. Even in the
context of mandatory desegregation, we have stressed that racial proportionality is not
required and here Jefferson County has already been found to have eliminated the
vestiges of its prior segregated school system.
Id. at 2759 (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
202. See id. at 2764 (plurality opinion) (indicating that all race-conscious plans are subject to
strict scrutiny). Whether to apply strict scrutiny to "benign" uses of race has been a central issue
for decades. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 234-35 (1995)
(focusing on the neutrality of equal protection and rejecting the notion that affirmative action
permitted more leeway); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-95 (1989)
(opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("[Tihe standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependant on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification."); id. at 536-
39 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (articulating the need to provide the government leeway in
remedying past discrimination and inequality). The Court, however, has applied strict scrutiny in
every instance. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003) (applying strict
scrutiny to the University of Michigan Law School admissions program); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 270-72 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to the University of Michigan undergraduate
admissions program); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204-05 (concluding the Court of Appeals erred in
failing to apply strict scrutiny); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 653 (1993) (remanding for
determination of whether a voting redistricting plan satisfies strict scrutiny); Croson, 488 U.S. at
492-94 (applying strict scrutiny to Richmond's minority business plan).
203. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based
on a classification that tells each student he or she is likely to be defined by race, so it is unlikely
any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.").
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the blow of his holding, but they do little to change the significant constraints
that the holding places on schools. Leading commentators will take such a
view of the opinion 204 and, most important, risk-averse schools are sure tofollow by staying well within any conceivable constraints.
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: IMPACT AND RELEVANCE
The actual practical impact of Parents Involved remains to be seen, but to
the extent most districts are not pursuing desegregation with aggressive plans,
the immediate effect of the opinion may be minimal. A recent publication by
the Civil Rights Project finds, "many of the policies and strategies that school
districts commonly use to promote school diversity were not directly addressed
or confronted by the Court."20 5 Implicit in this assessment is that these school
districts' plans either do not use race at all or use it so minimally that it poses
neither constitutional concerns, nor achieves significant desegregation. With
that said, the opinion limits any school that would adopt a more aggressive
plan. Thus, the Court's decision will discourage schools from considering
such plans. In this respect, the effects of the decision are symbolically
devastating and could hasten the end of meaningful desegregation.
A. Plans that Use Race in a General Way
On its face, Justice Kennedy's opinion purports to provide school districts
with options other than those chosen by Seattle and Louisville to achieve
desegregation, but in reality, these options are unlikely to yield much, if any,
desegregation. He asserts that schools, rather than using race to individually
206classify students, can desegregate by using race in a general way. He
suggests that "strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones
with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race"
could be appropriate methods. 207  He, however, ignores the problems
associated with these methods. Unfortunately, various data and examples
reveal that desegregating schools is far from that simple or easy. Justice
Breyer sums up our past experience, writing in dissent: "Nothing in the
extensive history of desegregation efforts over the past 50 years gives the
districts, or this Court, any reason to believe that [these] method[s can]
204. See, e.g., Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Glass Half Full: Envisioning the Future of Race
Preference Policies, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 385, 385-86 (2008) (finding Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion in Parents Involved "not well founded" and positing that "Justice Kennedy's
opinion could swing the Court to a position that is favorable to those who believe race-preference
policies are paramount to achieving a society free from segregation").
205. STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 49, at 23.
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accomplish" desegregation. 20 8  In reviewing all the evidence in the record,
amicus briefs, and legal history, there is not a single "example or model ... of
a desegregation plan that is likely to achieve [the schools'] objectives and also
makes less use of race-conscious criteria than [their] plans.
20 9
For instance, "as to 'strategic site selection,' Seattle has built one new high
school in the last 44 years (and that specialized school serves only 300
students). 2 1 ° Seattle's experience is not unique, but rather common in most
school districts. 21 Thus, although theoretically an option, site selection is
generally an unavailable tool. Simply redrawing attendance zones is an
available option to schools districts, but the efficacy of redrawing zones is low.
Most school districts have segregated schools largely because they have
segregated residential neighborhoods, 212 not because the attendance zones
themselves segregate students. Thus, shifting attendance zone lines would
produce minimal effects and result in most students still attending segregated
schools in their segregated neighborhoods. It is true that a single school could
draw students from various neighborhoods by using multiple attendance
zones.213 However, logistics would pose significant problems because poor
minority neighborhoods are often spatially distanced from white and more
affluent neighborhoods.214 Consequently, this type of attendance zone drawing
would require both busing and the mandatory assignment of students to
schools other than those in their neighborhoods. Putting issues of race entirely
aside, those two issues alone-busing and mandatory non-neighborhood
schools-have provoked some of the fiercest resistance seen in regard to
school desegregation. 215 To put it mildly, "decisions about where to assign
208. Id. at 2828 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 2827 (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id. at 2828.
211. STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 49, at 36 ("[T]he opportunity to site a new
school is relatively rare.").
212. See generally Paul M. Ong & Jordan Rickles, The Continued Nexus Between School and
Residential Segregation, 15 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 51, 57-59 (2004) (indicating that
neighborhood segregation and school segregation are closely related). However, Reardon and
Yun point out that some school assignment practices have nonetheless exacerbated school
desegregation beyond what residential segregation would normally produce. See Scan F.
Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools: The Retreat from
School Desegregation in the South, 1990-2000, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1563, 1575-81 (2003).
213. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 9 (1971)
(discussing a plan that used "'satellite' zones" to draw students from all over the district); Wendy
Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 475, 492 n.67 (1999) (explaining the clustering and pairing of schools as a
desegregative tool).
214. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 84-93 (1993) (describing geographic isolation between
blacks and whites).
215. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462 (1982) (discussing a
state wide ballot initiative to ban school busing); 20 U.S.C. § 1755 (2000) ("[N]o court of the
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students and how best to adjust attendance boundaries are often political and
sensitive ones, and encouraging racial diversity can be but one of many goals
that school officials keep in mind as they balance competing interests.
For purposes of this Article, it suffices to say that Justice Kennedy's other
217suggestions are likewise ineffective means of desegregation. Tracking data,
recruiting students and teachers, and offering special programs require nothing
of parents and very little of school districts. Rather, they simply leave the
future of desegregation to what is the equivalent of a pure laissez-faire market,
which in the past has permitted (if not tacitly encouraged), increased
segregation.2 18  In short, Justice Kennedy's suggestion that schools can use
general policies that simply consider race underestimates reality.
B. Plans that Consider the Race of Individuals and/or Factors that Correlate
with It
As indicated above, Justice Kennedy holds that if primary and secondary
schools classify individual students by race, "[r]ace may be one component of
• . . diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs,
should also be considered.,, 219 A plan that relies on a multifactor consideration
of diversity, however, is not likely to produce significant desegregation
because its design and purpose would be to produce diversity rather than
desegregation. If race is but one factor and the other factors do not correlate
with race, the plan would have no means to control for segregation. In all
fairness, it would have some effect on desegregation, but diversity simply is
not equivalent to racial desegregation. Achieving one does achieve the other.
To the extent it does, it is a side effect. Thus, although Justice Kennedy's
opinion does provide for the limited use of race in achieving diversity, it is no
more likely to produce desegregation than any of the previously discussed
suggestions.
With that said, a multifactor assignment policy that pursues desegregation in
terms of race, socioeconomic status, and geographic isolation, rather than
diversity, might have some chance of success. I suggest those as goals because
United States shall order the implementation of any plan to remedy a finding of de jure
segregation which involves the transportation of students, unless the court first finds that all
alternative remedies are inadequate.").
216. STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 49, at 36.
217. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2728,
2828-29 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the failure of special programs, targeted
recruiting, and tracking data to produce desegregation in Seattle and Louisville).
218. See Daniel R. Gordon, One Hundred Years After Plessy: The Failure of Democracy and
the Potentials for Elitist and Neutral Anti-Democracy, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 641, 666-67
(1996) ("The Brown Court found that African-American children were treated unequally even
when provided similar school houses and curricula. To reach this conclusion the Brown Court
turned away from the.., laissez faire thinking underlying Plessy.").
219. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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they, more than diversity, bear significant relevance to the schools' goal of
equalizing educational opportunities. Moreover, the goal of racial
desegregation is closely tied to these others insofar as racially segregated
minority schools generally suffer from concentrated poverty and geographic
isolation. By broadening desegregation beyond race to include socioeconomic
status and geographic desegregation, a school district could also respond to the
claim that race classifications alone were the basis for assignments.
A multifactor plan that relied on race, socioeconomic status, parental
education, and residential segregation could theoretically produce both racial
and socioeconomic desegregation. Most important in responding to Justice
Kennedy's concerns, such a plan would produce a different type of
desegregation than we have previously seen. Racial groups would not
automatically be lumped together and their race alone would not be decisive in
placements. For instance, a plan that relied on choice would not give all
minorities a preference when seeking assignment to a predominantly white
school, nor would it give all whites a preference when seeking admission to a
predominantly black school. Rather, among those seeking admission to a
predominantly white or middle class school, such a plan might only give
preference to minorities from the particular demographic group that needs the
alternative assignment the most: those trapped in racially isolated, poverty-
stricken, and low-performing schools.
Some schools have experimented with what they call diversity indexes,
which factor in socioeconomic status, parental income, the geographic area in
which one lives (giving particular weight to those who live in segregated
neighborhoods according to census track data), achievement at one's prior or
current school, parental education, housing status, and household structure or a
combination of the above. 22  One could use these factors in any number of
ways, but the confluence of these particular factors might allow schools to
produce more than just modest levels of desegregation. Moreover, to the
extent such a policy places significant weight on residence in a racially and
economically isolated neighborhood rather than an individual's race, it would
be race-neutral toward individuals. For instance, in assignment to a high
income or predominantly white school, both whites and minorities who live in
220. See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, A NEW WAY ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION, supra note 71, at 2-3
(summarizing the integration plans of various school districts that use these factors); S.F. UNIFIED
SCH. DIST., EDUCATION PLACEMENT, http://portal.sfusd.edu/template/default.cfm?page=policy.
placement.process (last visited Aug. 4, 2008). Berkeley, California, implemented a plan that
factors in race/ethnicity, parental education level, and parental income level. BERKELEY UNIFIED
SCH. DIST., BUSD STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLAN/POLICY, http://www.berkeley.net/index.php?
page=student-assignment-plan (last visited Aug. 4, 2008) [hereinafter BUSD PLAN]. The school
district assigns each of these factors a value, which it uses to calculate a diversity composite. Id.
This composite, however, is not based an individual student's race, parental income, or education.
See id. Rather, the student is assigned a diversity composite based on the overall characteristics
of the neighborhood in which they live, based on race, education and income. Id. Thus, every
child in a neighborhood would have the same score. See id.
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a racially isolated minority neighborhood would be favored over other
students, including racial minorities who are affluent or live in affluent
neighborhoods. A plan operating in this manner would respond to Justice
Kennedy's concern about the objectives and results of desegregation being
purely racial. 22' The program would promote both racial and socioeconomic
integration and prevent race from becoming the sole or predominate factor.
The drawback of such policies is that they are relatively sophisticated to
devise and administer and, consequently, can be expensive. 222  Schools that
realize the value of, and absolute need for, racially desegregated schools surely
would wonder why they need to jump through hoops, create what some would
223call "proxies" for race, and expend resources to obtain what the Court
recognizes to be a compelling interest. That is not to say that some schools
224will not operate such a desegregation plan despite the burden, but to
recognize that many may be discouraged rather than encouraged.
221. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (expressing concern that race would be used as a "bargaining chip in the political
process").
222. See, e.g., BUSD PLAN, supra note 220. The cost of creating and administering
Berkeley's plan is not immediately apparent, but its complexity is clear from the school's
following explanation of how it creates a diversity composite:
The three diversity factors detailed above [race, income, education level] are then
combined to yield an integer "classification" category limited to values 1, 2 and 3 ....
Because each diversity factor varies in the manner in which it is measured, it must be
linearly transformed from these disparate outcome spaces to a common outcome space
(a decimal value between 1.0 and 3.9). The three diversity factors are then "mapped"
using the following equation:
"Composite Diversity Average" =
.33 x (2. + (Parent Income Level - 34000)/(70000 - 34000)) +
.33 x (2. + (Parent Education Level - 3.4)/(4.1 - 3.4)) +
.33 x (2. + (70 - Percent Students of Color)/(67-30))
Each diversity category (1, 2 or 3) is derived from this "weighted average" by
applying two thresholds or "break points" to the decimal value. The breakpoints were
determined after multiple experiments and careful considerations. The breakpoints
were chosen to divide the city's K-5 population into three proportions.
Id.
223. In fact, an administrative complaint was filed against Wake County with the Office of
Civil Rights, alleging that the county was using poverty as a proxy for race. The Office for Civil
Rights rejected the complaint finding poverty was not a proxy and that the school had a legitimate
educational reason for its policy. KAHLENBERG, RESCUING BROWN, supra note 118, at 13 (citing
Letter from U.S. Dep't of Educ. Office of Civil Rights, S. Div., to William R. McNeal,
Superintendent, Wake County Pub. Sch. Sys., Aug. 29, 2003 (re OCR Complaint Nos. 11-02-
1044, 11-02-1104, and 11-02-1111)).
224. In fact, the Supreme Court decision has not dissuaded Louisville from its efforts. See
Antoinette Konz & Chris Kenning, Jefferson Wants Income, Race, Education, as Criteria,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 29, 2008, at Al. The school board recently heard a
proposal as to how it could still maintain integrated schools. Id. The plan would rely on race,
income, and family education levels as factors in assignments. Id. The school superintendent
explained that, "[u]nder the proposal, all schools-elementary, middle and high-must enroll at
least 15 percent and no more than 50 percent of their students from neighborhoods that have
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Second, simplifying the plans does not appear to be an option. For instance,
some might suppose that a school district could simply assign students based
on socioeconomic status and that these assignments would produce both racial
and socioeconomic status desegregation. Wake County, North Carolina, is the
most prominent example of such a plan. Wake County currently employs a
school assignment plan that relies on neighborhood socioeconomic status.
225
That plan is maintaining a relatively high level of racial desegregation. 226 With
that said, racial segregation has still increased beyond the levels present under
Wake County's previous race-based assignment plan. 227 Thus, the notion that
socioeconomic status is as effective as race in desegregating schools is flawed.
Nevertheless, the Wake County plan has been successful and research shows
that it has produced positive academic results for the system. 228 Unfortunately,
Wake County may be unique. First, the assignment plan requires mandatory
assignments to maintain the levels of desegregation. Researchers and
commentators posit that the community's unusual tolerance for mandatory
assignments stem from its positive history with court-ordered desegregation.
229
This tolerance, however, is far less likely in other localities. Second, the
demographics of Wake County are unique. Namely, race and socioeconomic
status have a significantly stronger correlation there than in other areas.
230
Moreover, residential segregation there highly correlates with socioeconomic
status, making it much easier to assign students based on block tracts from
census data than it would be elsewhere. 231 Outside of Wake County, research
has suggested that socioeconomic status alone, although producing
socioeconomic integration, would only produce modest levels of racial
desegregation.
232
The point here is simply that socioeconomic factors and race cannot be
separated if a system intends to produce racial desegregation. A system can
income and education levels below the district average and higher-than-average numbers of
minorities." Id.
225. STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 49, at 48 (indicating that socioeconomic
status is calculated by the poverty level in "small geographic units called 'nodes"').
226. See id at 49 ("[There is] a slight decline in racial diversity under the current plan, but
[the schools] remain relatively racially diverse.").
227. See id. at 49, 91-92.
228. See id. at 49, 92-93.
229. See Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents app. at
49-50, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos.
05-908 & 05-915), 2006 WL 2927079 [hereinafter Brief of 553 Social Scientists].
230. See id. at app. 49.
231. See id
232. See Sean F. Reardon, John T. Yun & Michael Kurlaender, Implications of Income-
Based School Assignment Policies for Racial School Segregation, 28 EDUC. EVALUATION &
POL'Y ANALYSIs 49, 50 (2006), available at http://epa.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/28/1/49 ("[I]t is
not clear how much racial desegregation can be attained using solely income-based school
assignment policies .... ").
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produce socioeconomic desegregation by making socioeconomic status the
sole or predominant factor as surely as a system can produce race
desegregation with race alone, but, as a general matter, both cannot be done
unless race is also a factor. 3  This point is important because those who
would tout race-neutral alternatives and demand that districts abandon all uses
of race simply fail to show that these alternatives can produce effective racial
desegregation. Both the briefs of the plaintiffs and of the United States (which
supported the plaintiffs) fail to point to one example where race-neutral
234alternatives alone have produced a desegregated school system. Again, as
Justice Breyer found, not even a lesser reliance on race than that used in the
instant cases, much less a race-neutral approach, has ever proven effective:
Having looked at dozens of amicus briefs, public reports, news
stories, and the records in many of this Court's prior cases, which
together span 50 years of desegregation history in school districts
across the Nation, I have discovered many examples of districts that
sought 'integration through explicitly race-conscious methods,
including mandatory busing. Yet, I have found no example or model
that would permit this Court to say to Seattle and to Louisville:
"Here is an instance of a desegregation plan that is likely to achieve
your objectives and also makes less use of race-conscious criteria
than your plans." And, if the plurality cannot suggest such a
model-and it cannot-then it seeks to impose a "narrow tailoring"
235requirement that in practice would never be met.
While it is true that socioeconomic status alone will not produce effective
and sustainable desegregation, the critique of socioeconomic plans may be too
harsh. Given a Supreme Court predisposed to rule against Louisville and
Seattle, there were important strategic considerations for not ceding anything
in regard to effectiveness of socioeconomic desegregation. Pure
socioeconomic plans simply lack the effectiveness of race-conscious plans by a
significant margin, but the Court may have disregarded this nuance, as it did
others. At this point, however, a continued critique that places race and
socioeconomic plans at odds, instead of developing the manner in which they
and other factors might be combined to overcome the barriers posed by
Parents Involved, may do more harm than good.
First, many of the structural factors that limit the effectiveness of
socioeconomic plans also limit race desegregation plans. Thus, the critique is
more appropriately directed toward the structural limitations themselves. For
233. See id. at 50, 67.
234. See Petitioner's Brief at 14-19, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-908), 2006
WL 2452374 (offering only general suggestions, such as neighborhood assignments or lottery
systems as race-neutral options); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 23-27, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 2415458 (citing
plans but not results).
235. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2827.
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instance, some have pointed out that the desegregative effectiveness of most
socioeconomic plans is limited because the most severe racial segregation
exists between school districts, not within individual school districts.
236
However, this kind of interdistrict segregation is a barrier to desegregation
237regardless of whether a plan relies on race or socioeconomic status. Without
interdistrict transfers that cross residential patterns of segregation,
desegregation is inherently limited. Similarly, some point out that effective
socioeconomic plans would require districts to assign and bus students to
schools distant from their neighborhood. Again, the same thing can be said of
effective racial desegregation. Whether race or socioeconomics is the factor,
schools and parents have resisted this measure.
Second, most critiques of socioeconomic plans are based on the poor results
that many of the current plans have produced.238  It is true that most of the
plans have produced poor results if the results are compared to race-conscious
plans. However, this comparison may be a comparison of apples and oranges.
Race plans are obviously superior to socioeconomic plans in terms of racial
desegregation, and supporters of socioeconomic plans do not argue
otherwise. 239 Their point is presumably that socioeconomic plans can increase
integration levels above the levels that would otherwise exist.
Moreover, even to the extent the results of these socioeconomic plans are
poor, the failure is not a failure of socioeconomic plans per se. Instead, the
failure is largely a result of the refusal to pursue aggressive socioeconomic
plans. As discussed earlier, most of these plans are meek, and that meekness,
even with the consideration of race, would be insufficient to reduce the current
trends of resegregation. 24  San Francisco, for instance, relies on
socioeconomic status and other non-racial factors when schools are
oversubscribed. 241  But the driving forces of the school assignment are
geographic proximity and parental choice, not socioeconomics or other242 ...
factors. With no constraints on choice and proximity, the odds are severely
against desegregation. 243 In addition, the system does not require equitable
distribution of students, thus allowing students to opt for popular schools while
236. Ryan, supra note 63, at 276.
237. Reardon, Yun & Kurlaender, supra note 232, at 67.
238. See, e.g., Brief of 553 Social Scientists, supra note 229, at app. 50-54 (noting the
decrease in racial integration in various school districts in recent decades).
239. But see KAHLENBERG, A NEW WAY ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION, supra note 71, at 1-2
(asserting that "socioeconomic school integration does a better job of raising academic
achievement than racial integration; it is not a 'clumsier, proxy device' to produce racial diversity
but rather is the single most powerful driver of academic achievement in schools." (footnote
omitted)).
240. See supra Part lI.B.
241. Reardon, Yun & Kurlaender, supra note 232, at 53; S.F. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., supra note
220.
242. See S.F. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., supra note 220.
243. See Reardon, Yun & Kurlaender, supra note 232, at 53.
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unpopular minority schools have numerous vacancies. Given the San
Francisco system's past experiences with desegregation, it should be no
surprise that this plan has done nothing to stem resegregation. Again, the
failure here is not one of socioeconomic plans per se; it is a failure of the
school district to be aggressive.
The leading study on socioeconomic plans, to which most others cite as
demonstrating the ineffectiveness of socioeconomic plans, actually implies or
concedes several of the above points to some extent. The conclusion of the
246
study is that socioeconomic plans do not guarantee racial desegregation.
First, this conclusion rules out the guarantee of desegregation; it does not rule
out desegregation or suggest resegregation. Second, the nuances of the study
suggest that one should not paint with broad brush strokes when speaking of
socioeconomic plans. The study points out that there are numerous variations
in how one might define socioeconomic integration, how one might pursue it,
and the demographics with which a school district will be working. All of. .... 248
these variations affect the potential for racial desegregation. Some
variations would render the plans entirely ineffective and others would produce
significant desegregation. Most important, the study examines the
effectiveness of plans that rely solely on socioeconomic status, but indicates
that incorporating additional factors could produce higher levels of racial
desegregation because "multiple factors are better than a single factor to the
extent that the multiple factors are collectively more highly correlated with
race than income alone. ' 25°  This caveat is important because, with the
exception of Wake County, most other schools incorporate factors beyond
socioeconomic status, presumably for this very reason.
Unfortunately, no matter how many factors a plan considers or how strongly
those factors correlate with race, the plans cannot produce significant
desegregation unless they aggressively use these factors. Schools cannot
capitulate entirely to neighborhood schools and parental choice, nor can they
use socioeconomic, race, and other factors sparingly when making
assignments. Arguing that schools can do more, however, is not to suggest
that Justice Kennedy was correct. These multifactor plans are still ineffective
and cumbersome in comparison to race-based plans. And most important, to
the extent racially segregated schools present an educational crisis, school
districts need guarantees-not reasonable chances--of desegregation. The
244. Id.
245. Id. at 67 (recognizing that interdistrict segregation and transportation is a problem for
both socioeconomic and race plans).




250. Id. at 68.
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research is clear that simplistic race-neutral plans do not offer this.25 1 Only the
most complicated, cumbersome, and thus, costly plans can produce significant
desegregation. However, even these plans would likely require schools to
sacrifice hallmarks of their plans, such as parental choice, which Grutter
indicates is not required.252
V. CONCLUSION
The death of school desegregation has been asserted prematurely too many
times for this Article to conclude that adversity alone, regardless of its extent,
will dissuade those who have always worked tirelessly to bring Brown's
promise to fruition.25 3  They were not dissuaded when the Court held that
254separate is equal, that courts lack the authority to order interdistrict
metropolitan desegregation, 255 or that demographic shifts are a basis to end
desegregation orders.' 56 Nor were they dissuaded when the Court curtailed the
educational improvements that could be ordered in all-black school districts.2
Thus, constraints on how a district can voluntarily desegregate will do no more
than any of these other decisions to dampen the spirits of those who understand
the importance of desegregation.
With each of these decisions, however, the Court sends a message. Prior to
Parents Involved, the message the Court was often sending was that it was
time to return authority to school districts and end mandatory desegregation.
258
The result was that district courts began doing just that.259 The message the
Court sends in Parents Involved is mixed at best: desegregation is important,
but not important enough for the Court to be flexible rather than constraining.
How school districts will react to this message is unknown. For the first time,
251. See generally id; see also Brief of 553 Social Scientists, supra note 229, at 13, app. 41-
45 (indicating that school choice and geographic assignments "tend to . . . lead to greater
segregation").
252. See KAHLENBERG, RESCUING BROWN, supra note 118, at 27-28 (describing criticism of
a redistricting plan that sought to give parents more of a choice in where their children went to
school).
253. Compare Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education,
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1053 (2005) ("The Brown decision, as far as the law is concerned,
is truly dead and beyond resuscitation."), and Kevin Brown, After the Desegregation Era: The
Legal Dilemma Posed by Race and Education, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 897, 898-99 (1993) (noting
the end of an era of court-ordered desegregation), with Dennis D. Parker, supra note 10, at 1069
(responding to the question of whether Brown's legacy has met its demise), and Wendy Parker,
School Desegregation, supra note 2, at 1159-60 (cautioning against concluding Brown is dead).
254. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896).
255. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974).
256. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992).
257. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 94-100 (1995).
258. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52
AM. U. L. REV. 1461, 1465-67 (2003) (discussing a line of cases that came together to "give a
clear signal to lower courts: the time has come to end desegregation orders").
259. See id. at 1467.
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civil rights attorneys may be powerless to use the legal system's authority to
compel schools to act. Thus, the future of desegregation rests on the goodwill
and good sense of school districts.
Fortunately, Brown has taught most of us enough to know that desegregated
schools make good sense and it has changed most of us enough that we can
rely on the goodwill of many schools. 26  This goodwill may not immediately
manifest itself, but insofar as our schools are in crisis, goodwill beckons them
to respond. Trying days are inevitably ahead in crafting plans that can both
produce effective desegregation and meet the rigors of Parents Involved, but
goodwill and good sense can prevail over bad decisions.
260. See Derek W. Black, Turning Stones of Hope into Boulders of Resistance: The First and
Last Task of Social Justice Curriculum, Scholarship and Practice, 86 N.C. L. REv. 673, 710-22
(2008).
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